Criticizing the Text: Textual Criticism

The documents have been discovered and enumerated, they have been described in technical detail and their physical make-up has been investigated, especially as it might affect the content of the text contained in the documents. The script or print has been read with care and appropriate transcriptions have been made. The historical and cultural circumstances of composition and transmission have been explored. What now? What do we do with all this information? The traditional response to this question has most commonly been to prepare a scholarly edition in order to present the information in a helpful manner to a learned audience. And the procedures typically used in preparing such scholarly editions are described in the final chapter of this book, as the logical fulfillment of all the textual activities encountered so far. But before plunging into the task of editing, the student should ideally have some sense of how this task has been undertaken by other scholars faced by the same problem of interposition, of standing between author and reader, of interpreting one to the other, of clarifying and elucidating a text whose features may have been obscured by the passage of time. For the single most important characteristic of textual criticism (that part of textual scholarship charged with interrogating the text and preparing it for public consumption, usually in the form of a scholarly edition) is that it is critical; it does involve a speculative, personal, and individual confrontation of one mind by another, despite the attempts by some textual critics to turn the process into a science, and despite the frequent misunderstanding by non-textuists, who often suppose that textual criticism is merely a mechanical imposition of certain technical procedures in order to produce "definitive editions" of works that can be accepted
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To this end, this chapter on textual criticism will offer a brief history of the critical reading of texts, concluding with an account of the various current camps and their attitudes to the problems of text and textuality. The survey must be somewhat cursory, for only those positions which have been most influential can be touched on, as can only those editors and textual theorists whose work has contributed to important critical principles still being employed. It is in reality a long story, told all too quickly here, but the account should at the very least provide a frame of reference for the practical editorial matters to follow in the final chapter.

Classical Textual Criticism

Textual criticism is the most ancient of scholarly activities in the West. Before the theoretical literary criticism of Plato and Aristotle, unknown Greek scholars had, by the end of the sixth century B.C., established the text (or more properly, a text) of the Homeric epics by an admittedly subjective reading in order to remove the errors that had crept in as a consequence of continued oral transmission. There was even a legend that Aristotle himself had prepared an edition of Homer. This sort of scholarship, while itself subject to the dictates of personal judgment, was a conscious attack on the claim of the rhapsodes, or professional reciters of poetry, to have preserved the Homeric text perfectly, and marks the first acknowledgment that any act of transmission, oral or scribal, is inherently partial to corruption. Peisistratus (560–527 B.C.) is credited with the decision to have an "official" text of Homer compiled for the Panathenea festival, although none of the features of this text have survived. But the characteristics of the early Greek book encouraged further corruption in copying: without word-division or punctuation, with verse written out as prose, subjected to the continual revision of declaimer and actor, the texts of both epic and drama presented many of the problems still encountered by editors of medieval prose or poetry and Renaissance drama. In an attempt to overcome this tendency toward textual dissolution, Lycurgus (ca. 390–324 B.C.) placed a standard copy of the texts of Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides in the public archives in 330 B.C. However, it is unlikely that Lycurgus's standard editions of the Greek dramatists were any more authoritative than others currently in circulation, and the deposit should be seen more as an effort to prevent further corruption than as a scholarly attempt to overcome cor-
ruptions already present in the text. The deposit did at least slow down the circulation.

Before genuine textual scholarship was possible, a large archive containing many different manuscripts of the same works was necessary. Under the advice of Demetrius of Phalerum, this step was undertaken by Ptolemy Soter, who in ca. 284 B.C. named Zenodotus of Ephesus (ca. 325–ca. 234 B.C.) as the first Chief Librarian at Alexandria. The manuscripts in the Alexandrian library, in the form of papyrus rolls, might have grown to a collection of 750,000 during the next two centuries (estimates vary). Zenodotus approached his duties as scholar and archivist from two perspectives: first, through the compilation of an Homeric Glossary, an attempt to define the "hard" words in the Homeric epics, largely by context, and therefore open to some very subjective readings; and second, through editing both the Iliad and the Odyssey, after collating the many manuscripts of each work in the library. It was Zenodotus who divided the two epics into twenty-four books, who began the process of rejecting spurious lines by marking them with an obelisk, and who introduced marginal signs into the text. He transposed and telescoped problematical lines and generally tried to produce a "perfect" text from the corrupt remnants in the extant manuscripts. Unfortunately, there was no basic theory of reconstruction involved in Zenodotus's editing, and he was later criticized for relying too heavily on highly subjective criteria.

His successors Aristophanes of Byzantium (ca. 217–ca. 180 B.C.) and Aristarchus of Samothrace (ca. 220–145 B.C.) attempted to reduce this subjective element and to make textual reconstruction more technical and less whimsical. This movement approached a system of criticism only in the work of Aristarchus, for his predecessor Aristophanes, while producing "standard" critical editions of the dramatic works of Euripides and the comedies of his namesake Aristophanes, and a collected edition of Pindar, still based much of his textual judgment on purely esthetic values, rather than on paleographic or codicological characteristics as well. With Aristarchus, the first textual criticism to combine both esthetic and technical evidence began. Often cited as the "complete" critic (by, for example, Horace and Cicero), he brought to his editing a wide knowledge of grammar, etymology, orthography, and literature. The remnants of his commentaries contained in the medieval commentaries or scholiasts show him to have been a highly conservative critic, who tried to remove the layers of conjecture built up by his predecessors. He produced critical recensions, not only of the Iliad and the Odyssey, but also of Hesiod, Pindar, Anacreon, Archilochus, and Alcaeus, trying as far as possible to isolate "good" manuscripts for each of these authors. Some of his critical method is open to the same charge of circular reasoning later leveled at the Lachmannian system (see below), for he invoked such criteria as consistency and decorum (in both technical and literary senses) in the establishment of a reading. Since such judgments largely depended upon the evaluation of readings already contained in extant witnesses (which were therefore declared "good" or "bad" by their success or failure to be "consistent" or "decorous"), Aristarchus's method could in practice merely confirm his esthetic predispositions. But the technical stance was important to the direction of textual criticism as a discipline.

This reliance upon individual critical perceptions (often masquerading as "scientific" methodology) becomes, in fact, the major characteristic of the Alexandrian school of analogy. According to this theory, it is possible to re-create a genuinely "Homeric" usage out of the corrupt documentary remains simply by constructing an ideal paradigm of "correctness," involving, therefore, a critical evaluation of this documentary evidence, and an ability to recognize the "Homeric" (or "Shakespearian" or "Miltonic") reading from the merely scribal. Analogy also allows the textual critic not only to sort the authorial from the non-authorial through collation, but also to create (or reconstruct) an authoritative reading where none of the extant documents seems to represent the expected or appropriate usage. Obviously, this method can, in the hands of an able critic, produce a sensitive and discriminating text responsive to authorial intention—and can certainly take the reader much closer to this intention than could a reliance upon any one of the corrupt "remaniements" or surviving documents.

But it is equally obvious that in the hands of an enthusiastic perpetrator of an author's work, a critic who values "smoothness," "consistency," and "correctness" more than documentary "authority," the analogy method can result in extreme eclecticism, subjectivism, and normalization according to the esthetic dictates of the critic, not the author. At the opposite extreme, the Pergamanian linguistic and scholarly rivals of the Alexandrian analogists invoked the principle of anomaly. This principle, dependent upon a Stoic acceptance of the inevitable corruption of all temporal, earthly phenomena as a result of man's "fallen" condition, maintains that it is impossible to create or re-create an ideal form (of grammar, a system of accidence, or of authorial usage) and that the only honest recourse is to select that specif-
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lost in the process of making these selected editions, but what remained does not seem to have undergone severe corruption. Additional loss occurred when the old papyrus roll was gradually replaced by the parchment codex in the fourth and fifth centuries (see Chapter 2), for only the most popular works would be transferred to the new expensive medium. The Bibliotheca of Photius (ninth century) is one of the most significant of these abridgements. Compiled by the Patriarch of Constantinople at the request of his brother Tarasius, the work is an encyclopedic effort to summarize critical responses to 280 prose works read by Photius, and it provides much information about otherwise lost material. But like the Suda, an historical and literary lexical encyclopedia compiled at the end of the tenth century, the sloppily edited contents of the Bibliotheca testify to the severe decline in Greek textual scholarship. Not until the activities of Tzetzes and the Paleologoi at Byzantium (see below) was there to be any genuine textual criticism of manuscripts in Greek.

In the Roman world, there was initially no Homer to stimulate early editorial work, and the first Latin scholars therefore tend to be grammarians and linguistic researchers rather than editors and textual scholars. Crates of Mallos is usually credited with provoking the Romans to this linguistic analysis, and the linguistic rather than textual bias meant that Latin scholarship was more typically involved with etymological, grammatical, or even orthographic research, than with textual analysis. Varro’s De lingua latina, Nigidius Figulus’s Commentarii grammatici, Verrius Flaccus’s De orthographia and De verbis nominativi—Quintilian’s Ars grammatica—these works show the general direction of Latin scholarship. The founding of the Palatine Library in 28 B.C., the appointment of Julius Hyginus as librarian, and the appearance of Virgil as the Roman national poet, balanced this linguistic interest with a concern for textual matters. Hyginus produced a commentary on Virgil, and in the first century A.D. Asconius Pedianus wrote a similar commentary on Cicero’s orations, and Valerius Probus began the careful editing of the earliest available manuscripts of Latin authors.

Lexicographical and grammatical studies continued in Aulus Gellius’s Noctes Atticae (second century), and the later Greek indulgence for abridgments and selections was paralleled by Solinus’s epitome of Pliny, the De mirabilibus mundi, and by Nonius Marcellus’s De compendiosa doctrina. The exegetical tradition can be represented by Servius Honoratus’s commentary on Virgil, which is determinedly scholarly in that it omits any mere literary criticism, and by the ex-

ic utterance or that extant document which, on philological or other grounds (e.g., provenance) seems best to represent authorial intention, and once having made that selection, to follow the readings of the document as closely as possible. To the Pergamians and their text-critical descendants in the last two millennia, all utterances and readings are anomalous, so that critical judgment is suspended once the first leap of faith has been made. Obviously, this method can produce very careful and very conservative texts, but it does involve a failure of critical nerve in blindly accepting all readings of the “best text”; and this failure (in, for example, some of the editions produced by both late nineteenth-century Lachmannians and proponents of Bédier’s “best-text” theory, see below) has been noted and ridiculed by those critics for whom discrimination among extant readings, no matter where they occur, is a proper and an inevitable part of editing. The polarities of analogy and anomaly (under different names and different dispensations) have, therefore, been present from the beginnings of textual criticism in the West, and the debate between their constituencies shows no signs of waning.

Complementing their critical editions of standard authors (who became standard largely by the fixing of a secure canon of authors and works), the Alexandrian scholars produced exegetical works, lexicographical, metrical, and grammatical studies intended to enhance the elucidation of the texts. An interest in this type of ancillary material became associated with the Pergamians (where, according to tradition, parchment was first used in place of papyrus, see Chapter 2), and where the canon of literature was extended to include prose as well as poetry. Inevitably, this accretion of scholarship began to acquire a value of its own, and from the second century B.C. variorum commentaries (editions recording a wide range of textual and critical annotations) were published in their own right, though usually with lemmata (head-words to each note) linking them with the text itself. As public interest began to shift from the primary works to the secondary commentaries and critical analyses, the continued use of such devices as the referential lemmata (cross-references) helped to preserve the original text from further corruption, since the commentary would “fit” only a particular edition. Today, the New Variorum Shakespeare prints the lineation of both the Globe edition and the Norton Facsimile First Folio to ensure the same sort of “fit.”

Another change in popular taste, reflecting the general decline in interest in classical Greek authors, is the growth from the first century A.D. of anthologies and abridged versions. It is likely that much was
tremely influential commentary on Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis* by Macrobius. Late Latin scholarship tends more and more to the encyclopedic rather than the textual, and can be represented by three works: the fifth-century *Nuptiae Philologiae et Mercurii* of Martianus Capella, a "liberal arts" pedagogical arrangement of ancient learning; the sixth-century *Institutiones grammaticae* of Priscian, the most comprehensive work on Latin grammar; and the seventh-century *Etymologiae* of St. Isidore of Seville, a compendium of all learning and pseudo-learning, which passed on to medieval Europe the classical educational system of the declining Roman world.

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Isidore of Seville was a bishop (and later a saint) as well as a scholar, but his *Etymologiae*, while finding a place for God and theology, is essentially a product of a pagan tradition of scholarship. For example, it reflects the pagan educational system in its organization, which is based on rhetoric rather than on theological principles (i.e., God does appear, but not at the beginning of the book, which is devoted to the liberal arts). In textual scholarship as in so much else, medieval Europe was influenced by both this pagan tradition and by its Hebrao-Christian equivalent. The special problem for textual critics of biblical studies was, of course, that in dealing with the word of God, they had to be especially careful in the employment of the tools of textual scholarship. The fundamentally esthetic (and therefore secular) principles of Zenodotus would be impossible in the biblical scholar, and this limitation may, in fact, have discouraged some of the more arbitrary excesses typical of secular textual critics of the eclectic or analogy schools, although there can be little doubt that it also inhibited the scholarship even of textual polemicists like Jerome. In fact, it was not until the growth of the Higher Criticism (see below) in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that biblical textual scholarship could safely approach its subject-matter without a doctrinal apologia.

The text of the Hebrew Bible (Old Testament) was established fairly securely in a version known as the Masoretic text, at some time between the sixth and eighth centuries A.D. The Masoretes, or preservers of the biblical text, were responsible for ensuring accuracy and consistency in the vocalization, accentuation, and word-division of the consonantal Hebrew text. But while textual emendation since the establishment by the Masoretes has been minimal, a comparison of the Masoretic version with the Septuagint (the Greek translation of the Old Testament produced for Alexandrian Jews in the second century B.C.) shows that there must have been considerable textual divergence at an earlier date. But since the textual tradition of the Septuagint, while it antedates the Masoretic "fixing," is by no means clear and unequivocal itself, the Greek translation cannot always be used with confidence in emending the Masoretic version. The Dead Sea Scrolls confirmed the textual ambiguity of the two traditions, and showed that while the Masoretes undoubtedly performed a very necessary task as purifiers of the Hebrew Bible, this purification was achieved at the sacrifice of a number of rival textual traditions; in a sense, the Masoretes created a *textus receptus* for the faithful, consistent and reliable, but not necessarily displaying the greatest degree of fidelity to textual history.

However, the textual variety of the Hebrew Bible pales before the documentary superabundance of the New Testament. Most important manuscripts of the New Testament date from the second to the tenth century. Containing the most "popular" book of the period (and a book which, unlike the Hebrew Bible was far from being fixed textually), the manuscripts of the New Testament were not only especially prone to the accidental errors introduced by the thousands of scribes laboring in the endless copying of exemplars, but were also subject to "determined variation," the conscious (and no doubt pious) desire of the scribe to harmonize the text with other biblical books and to clarify dubious passages. Furthermore, in a time of sectarian feuding, of voluminous patristic commentary, and of the important work of translation, it was inevitable that all three of these activities should further exacerbate the tendency toward textual dissolution, while paradoxically contributing to the authority of the text itself. Thus, the Latin and Syriac versions of the Greek, and the textual references of the early Fathers, demonstrate that the textual variants must have been even more ambiguous than the evidence of the extant manuscripts suggests today.

What was a biblical scholar to do with this embarrassment of riches, and how could the evidence of the witnesses be disentangled and evaluated? The way had already been shown to New Testament textual critics by the work of the Old Testament scholar Origen (d. 255), who drew up in his *Hexaplar*, a comparative Old Testament text in six columns (as the name suggests), containing the original Hebrew, the Hebrew transliterated into Greek, the two Greek versions of Aquila and Symmachus, the Septuagint, and the Septuagint revision by Theo-
dotion. This monumental collation (it was not strictly speaking an edition), which took fourteen years to produce, was in principle to be the basis for most textual criticism of the Bible throughout the medieval period and into modern times, as when Erasmus produced a Greek text of the New Testament (with a parallel Latin version) based on a careful collation of as many manuscripts as were available to him, complemented by readings from patristic sources. In the late classical world, however, the mantle of Origen was assumed with greatest authority by Jerome who, despite his involvement in political and doctrinal squabbling, seems to have been able to bring a relatively objective scholarly approach to his work on the text of the Bible. He was always interested in textual matters. He visited the Nazarenes of Beroea to examine their claim to hold a supposed Hebrew gospel which was the source for Matthew. He became a devotee of Origen’s exegetical and collatorial method of investigating different versions of a work. The loyalty to Origen’s theology was not to last, but the acceptance of the scholarly method was permanent. At the order of Pope Damasus, he undertook the revision of the Old Latin versions of the Gospels, which had been criticized for betraying too much divergence and for being lacking in literary style. He compared the Old Latin versions with Greek texts, and tried as far as possible to preserve familiar usage while bringing the Latin into line with that branch of the Greek textual tradition now best represented by the Codex Sinaiticus in the British Library. His work on the Old Testament began with the Psalms, of which he was to make three versions, the second of which was based on the Hexaplar of Origen. It was only in the third version that he translated directly from the Hebrew instead of the Septuagint, and during the fifteen years of his residence at Bethlehem, he translated the entire Old Testament from the Hebrew.

Inevitably, the same forces which had led the Greek version of the New Testament to multiplicity and corruption caused Jerome’s Vulgate to require continued revision by such medieval textual scholars as Alcuin, Theodulfus, and Lanfranc. But without a secure methodological, no medieval editor was able to produce anything but an eclectic text of the Vulgate, mixing various strains of textual tradition according to the doctrinal lights of a particular sensibility. The universality of Latin hindered any genuine collatorial effort, for polyglots like Jerome were rare in the medieval world of Latin Christendom. The only data readily available were the accumulations of text and textual commentary, both subject to scribal error. The eight thousand surviving Vulgate manuscripts testify to Jerome’s success in making his translation the accepted version of the Bible for well over a millennium, but also to the inherent problems of the act of transmission in such a popular medium. The very centrality of the text of the New Testament in Latin Europe made the possibility of producing a reliable or consistent version of that text ever more difficult.

Early Medieval Textual Criticism

As noted in Chapter 2, it was in the monastic foundations that classical literature and the newer patristic and biblical commentaries were preserved in the early Middle Ages. What sort of textual criticism was practiced in such foundations? According to the theoretical rules of accuracy required in the scriptoria and according to the obvious authority and respect given to the word of God, one might suppose that a conservative fidelity was the norm, at least for scribe and scholar. But the evidence is ambiguous at best.

Take, for example, the career of perhaps the most highly praised of medieval textual scholars—Lupus of Ferrières (ca. 805–862). Working at first under Habanus Maurus at Fulda, he became determined to increase the holdings of Ferrières when he was transferred there in 836. He wrote to such centers as Tours, York, and Rome to arrange for the loan of manuscripts, especially of works which his library already possessed. His purpose was to employ the Alexandrian principle of collation (which, as we have seen, attempted to reconstruct a putative original form from the comparison of variant copies), and he both marked corruptions and recorded variants just as the Alexandrians had done. He seems to have been basically conservative, for he would leave a space where a textual lacuna (a break in the text) was suspected, rather than risk a conjectural emendation of his own. In annotating Cicero’s De inventione, Livy, Macrobius, and Aulus Gellius, and in producing an edition of Cicero’s De oratore himself, he testified to the importance of the scribal and editorial duties in the monastic foundation. He stood in the main line of the medieval editorial tradition, for his master Habanus had been taught by Alcuin of York, and he himself taught Remigius and Heiric, who went on to have distinguished independent careers, cast very much in the mold of their master. And yet, as E. J. Kenney remarks, “to apply terms such as ‘philology’ to what we know of the activities even of a scholar like Lupus of Ferrières verges on an abuse of language” (3). Without the paleographic skills of the later Maurists, without a
humanist revival, with its attention to the studia humanitatis (grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry, and moral philosophy) and so ultimately to the philological investigations that were necessary to the successful editing of both Christian and pagan literature.

Late Medieval and Renaissance

The wide reading and the search for lost texts exemplified by a man like the "pre-humanist" Lovato Lovati (1241–1309) were an indication of the direction textual work was taking. Lovato knew Catullus, Propertius, Tibullus, and Lucretius long before these authors were "discovered" by Petrarch, Poggio, and Salutati. And it similarly was both a wide and a close reading of the text which, for example, enabled Giovanni de Matociis (fl. 1306–20) to make the first successful textual distinction between the two Plinys, and which allowed Geremia da Montagnore (ca. 1255–1321), while a compiler of a typical medieval florilegium (Compendium moralium notabilium), to uncover Seneca's tragedies for the later humanists proper. These considerations aside, there can be no doubt that when Petrarch (1304–74) created his own version of Livy, corrected and annotated from the fragments that had been all that the medieval scholar had been able to read of the great historian, he was attempting something different in kind from either the comparative reticence of Lupus or the enthusiasm of the typical scribe. In recording the variants of Livy in a separate note-book, in making use of the papal court at Avignon as a central repository for manuscripts from all over Europe, in discovering a copy of Cicero's Letters to Atticus in the Chapter Library of Verona in 1345, in mentioning no medieval works in his list of his favorite authors copied on the flyleaf of a manuscript—in all this work of discovery, enumeration, collation, and emendation, Petrarch was pushing textual criticism towards the philological and humanist bias of the new Renaissance Europe.

Boccaccio was a similarly devoted hunter for manuscripts, probably having access to Monte Cassino and bringing back to Florence a number of important Beneventan manuscripts (including one of Varro). He was perhaps less careful in making copies than Petrarch, but balanced this by an interest in publishing the lesser-known classical poets, including Martial and Ausonius. Coluccio Salutati (1331–1406) not only plundered the East for Greek manuscripts, he was lucky at home, too. While looking for a Cicero Atticus, his agent...
Pasquino Capelli accidentally turned up a manuscript of the *Ad familiares* in the Cathedral Library at Vercelli. But he did not just bring manuscripts to Florence, he brought scholars. Through his invitation to Manuel Chrysoloras, Greek began to be studied seriously in Western Europe once more. And finally, continuing the Alexandrian tradition, he was a determined manuscript collector, bringing together many copies of the same work in an effort to see how corruptions had occurred.

Poggio Bracciolini (1380–1459) has, like Petrarch, Boccaccio, and Salutati, already been encountered as a manuscript collector (see Chapter 2). As papal secretary, he traveled widely throughout Europe—to Konstanz, Cluny, St. Gall, Cologne—and everywhere he sought ancient manuscripts of classical authors (Cicero, Quintilian, Valerius Flaccus, Lucretius, Manilius, Ammianus Marcellinus) to provide the raw materials for editing by others. His contribution to textual scholarship is therefore primarily as a bibliophile and book collector (all entertainingly set down in his letters to his patrons and fellow-bibliophiles), but, as the inventor of one of the new humanist scripts (see Chapter 5), he gave the copying of manuscripts a new tool in the clarity and legibility of scribal reform.

With the materials at hand, the serious editing could begin. And the first major humanist editor is Lorenzo Valla (1407–57), who, educated in Latin and Greek by Aurispa and Bruni and holder of the chair in rhetoric at Rome from 1450, brought a new philological independence of mind to the study of both classical and Christian documents. His specialty was the exposure of forgery and stupidity. He successfully criticized the *Donation of Constantine* (on linguistic and historical grounds) as an eighth- or ninth-century forgery, thereby depriving the popes of the documentary basis for their claim to temporal political power, since the Roman church had always cited the *Donation* as proof that the Emperor Constantine had deeded secular as well as spiritual authority to the Papacy. He correctly described the supposed correspondence of Seneca and St. Paul as a forgery; he attacked the scholarship of the court of Alfonso in his *Emendationes sex librorum Titii Livii*; and, using both Greek and patristic texts, began to emend the Vulgate on philological principles in an edition (the *Adnotationes in Novum Testamentum*) printed by Erasmus in 1505.

It was Politian (Angelo Poliziano, 1454–94) however, who can be credited with the first inklings of a genealogical theory of manuscript affiliation. He showed that the *P* manuscript of Cicero’s *Epistole ad familiares* was a copy of the *M* and that *P* was the parent of other ex-

...tant manuscripts. His theory that all late manuscripts must ultimately derive from and be less authoritative than older ones was no doubt too unyielding a position (based on his disdain for humanist copying), but he articulated for the first time the principle that conjectural emendation can only begin from the earliest recoverable stage of transmission (the so-called O—O prime, or archetype of later textual criticism).

This principle, and its corollary of the *eliminatio codicum descriptorum* (the uselessness as primary textual authority of derived copies where their exemplars are still extant) are two of the most basic arguments in the development of the genealogical, or stemmatic, system of analysis—although some recent classicists (e.g., Timpanaro “Stemmatic Method” and Reeves “Eliminatio”) have questioned the value of the *eliminatio*, Timpanaro suggesting the adoption of *eliminatio codicum inutilium* (“useless”) in place of *descriptorum* (187), and Reeves going further, providing “proof” that establishing the exclusive derivation of one manuscript from another is not merely difficult but impossible” (1). Such conclusions would confirm Willis’s view that the medieval (and late classical) tradition of copying the classics is characterized by conflation and contamination, not direct linear descent, but the axiom propounded by Maas in his defense of Lachmannian stemmatics (“If a witness, J, presents all the errors of another witness extant, F, and at least one of its own besides, then J must derive from F” §8a) has in general been widely accepted as a necessary means of sorting good (or independent) witnesses from bad.

The healthy textual skepticism and rigor of Valla and Politian was continued when Erasmus (ca. 1466–1536) produced an extremely influential (if somewhat controversial) edition of the New Testament in 1516, based upon earlier research on the text of the Bible, and particularly on his reading, in 1504, of the Valla *Adnotationes* on the New Testament. Valla had found the textual tradition of the Vulgate guilty of subjective eclecticism and had advocated a strictly philological approach to biblical textual criticism. Erasmus was impressed by these arguments (so much so that, as mentioned earlier, he published an edition of the *Adnotationes* in 1505), and began collecting manuscripts of the Greek New Testament and making copies therefrom. After the usual peripatetic and polemical interruptions characteristic of his career, he produced his edition of the Greek eleven years later, with the philological assistance of other scholars. The new text, despite inaccuracies zealously pointed out by political and scholarly enemies, generally found favor with such contemporaries as Luther, Vadianus of St. Gall, A. Karlstadt at Wittenberg, and Thomas Bilney and Rob-
ert Barnes at Cambridge. It was probably the prefaces which caused the greatest excitement.

In these prefaces Erasmus launched his famous plea for translations into every tongue, and it is here that he explained the new philological method of textual criticism, an appeal to scholarly objectivity after the whimsical or doctrinal editing of earlier centuries. To Erasmus, the Bible as a text could be treated in the same way as any other work, and although his knowledge and experience of paleography was not great and his understanding of genealogical affiliation not as developed as Politian’s, it was his ideological position that texts—religious or otherwise—should be studied by scholars in the original language and edited according to philological rather than theological principles which gave respectability to the later efforts of such textualists as Scaliger, Bentley, and Lachmann.

His actual editorial work was inconsistent, for although he knew his codex B to be very old, he employed it only occasionally for collation, and actually made his own Greek translation from the Vulgate where he felt the original Greek to be too corrupt for emendation. Finally, he was unable to articulate his unease over the readings found in a forged Greek manuscript (readings which tended to reinforce later Church doctrines over those found in the original Greek) because he had no way to test the authenticity of this forgery. In other words, he was a better advocate for humanistic/philological editing than a textual critic, for he lacked the technical skills to defend positions which he sensed to be right.

In what sense was Renaissance textual scholarship of the type practiced by Erasmus and Valla different from medieval? According to the famous oration of the philosopher Ramus in 1546, not only had contemporary learning overcome the Scholastics’ dependence on Aristotle, but all of the major classical authors were now being read in good editions instead of in the inherently corrupt medieval compilations. The problem with Ramus’s argument is that while there was no doubt a desire to purify the text from its medieval accretions and indiscretions, most of these new Latin editions were based on manuscripts which had themselves been copied by medieval scribes. Furthermore, there was no theory of textual criticism which could adequately distinguish a good manuscript from a bad one, nor was there to be until the Maurists’ work on paleography and the Lachmannian genealogical method created the first thorough-going technical system for evaluating scribal hands and textual transmission. The most that could be done was either to use a modified version of the Origen Hex-
aplar: i.e., to accumulate as much documentary evidence as possible and then to make eclectic decisions based upon a sense of the “rightness” of each reading—Alexandrian analogy—or to select a copy-text which seemed complete, consistent, and of good provenance, and to reproduce it faithfully (Pergamanian anomaly).

The collecting of Latin and Greek manuscripts (many in private libraries) would certainly assist both of these methods, as would the sheer proliferation of manuscripts from a desire for ownership that was as much acquisitive as it was scholarly. The increased availability of witnesses, coupled with the breaking of the Church’s textual hegemony, made the practice of textual scholarship easier in the Renaissance than in the Middle Ages; and a growing sense of historical evolution, compounded by the Renaissance self-awareness as a deliberately “modern” period after the apparent sterility of the medieval mind and society, helped promote the various nascent philological disciplines (paleography, linguistics, etc.). But none of these disciplines acquired a developed methodology during the Renaissance, and all therefore depended ultimately on the personal predilections and skills of the editor. Manuscripts did indeed become more available, but the competence to deal with them was still wanting.

The Eastern Empire

It used to be thought that it was the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453 which drove Greek manuscripts to the West and therefore initiated the revival of classical learning, of which textual criticism was a part. However, there is ample evidence that Italian humanists (“entrepreneurs” is almost the better word) had despoiled the archives of the decaying Eastern Empire of the Byzantines long before. Textual criticism and the preservation of the classical texts in the East had long been in decline. However, there are some important names to be mentioned. In the eleventh century, for example, there was an awakened interest in classical texts following the lectures of Michael Psellus (1018–78) on Plato and Aristotle; and while she did not give lectures, but rather lived a completely secluded life, Anna Commena similarly promoted textual study of the classics.

But it was Eustathius, Abbot of Thessalonica (ca. 1160–92), who began the serious revival of textual methodology in the East. He collaborated various texts of Sophocles’ Antigone in the Alexandrian manner and produced a huge variorum commentary on Homer, in which the
discussion of the first line of the *Iliad* took some ten pages. John Tzetzes (ca. 1110–80), with his commentaries on Aristophanes, Hesiod, and Homer, based on immense reading of primary and secondary documents, was the last major figure of Byzantine textual scholarship to have the advantage of the Constantinople libraries, for, in 1204, the Fourth Crusade arrived in the Eastern capital and probably destroyed more manuscripts than did the Turkish reduction of the city two centuries later. The later work of, for example, Maximus Planudes (ca. 1255–1305), Demetrius Triclinus (fl. 1305–20), and the Paleologoi (important for the revised *Greek Anthology*, including materials not found in the tenth-century *Palatine Anthology*) takes place in an atmosphere of decline. Planudes is important, but ironically he was most widely read not in Greek but in Latin, and his and Triclinus’s search for early Greek literary texts—especially Plutarch—demonstrates an admirable bibliographical principle (the importance of charting the history of transmission) but also reflects the same sense of discontinuum which motivated the Latin humanists to begin assembling the “lost” works of their classical heritage. Planudes’ complaints about the shortage of parchment are perhaps symptomatic of the same decline.

With Planudes stands Triclinus: neither can be counted as particularly reliable editors, for Planudes simply replaced apparently corrupt lines with his own verses when he felt the text to be intractable, and Triclinus was a confirmed normalizer, emending metrics to produce ideal, regular forms, but at least provided the Western world with the text of nine otherwise unknown plays by Euripides. Without this last stand of Byzantine scholarship, without the anthologizers, the epitomizers, and the commentators, the losses to Greek literature would certainly have been much greater, and while the standards of editing had declined since the great days of the Alexandrians, Constantinople and the last Byzantine scholars proved an immensely useful reservoir for the stimulation and continuance of textual criticism in the Latin West.

It was this reservoir which Salutati hoped to use when, as Chancellor of the Florentine *signoria*, he specifically instructed his envoy Jacopo Anglo in 1398 to look in Constantinople for Greek manuscripts of Homer, Plato, and Plutarch. Twenty years later, Giovanni Aurispa came back with 238 literary manuscripts, and there are many other similar stories. Theoretically, it was possible to argue that any edition based on a Greek manuscript thus retrieved would be superior to a medieval Latin translation of an Arabic version of the same origi-

nal (it was, of course, in this latter condition that the works of Aristotle were first known in the West, until William of Moerbeke began translations into Latin directly from the Greek). But, as the discussion of the Septuagint has shown, such textual assumptions cannot always be defended. In fact, since the early function of these Greek manuscripts was merely to serve as the bases for Latin translations (as in the case of Moerbeke’s Aristotle), the question is moot. Even when the Greek texts were used in their own right, it would be a mistake to think of these editions as critical by modern standards. Either they were exponents of a simple “best-text” theory without the rationale or the technical requirements for best-text selection, or they were idiosyncratic and eclectic editions exemplifying the editor’s esthetic disposition as much as the author’s. The great achievement of the Aldine press in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries was not in producing scholarly editions (though many of these texts were prepared by the most eminent humanists of the time), but in making the Greek and Latin classics available to the new audience of “conoscen-ti” and “dilettanti” in a cheap, easily portable form—largely through the brilliant use of Griffo’s italic font (see Chapter 6).

**The Rise of Philology**

The achievements of the early Renaissance (e.g., of Erasmus in biblical textual criticism) are more than matched by the first great secular scholars of the modern period—the two Scaligers. The elder, Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484–1556) is important to this survey primarily for his *De causis linguae latinae* of 1540, an analysis of the theory of Latin grammar. But the elder Scaliger was not primarily a textual critic, and his concern was not to produce through critical method an authoritative version of an ancient work, but rather to criticize the content, style, and philosophy of the work itself. His *Poetice*, published posthumously in 1561 was, therefore, justifiably his most popular book, for its focus is on literary criticism, conducted, however, with a strong underpinning of rhetorical theory and philological analysis. Rather, it was his tenth son, Joseph Justus Scaliger (1540–1609), who can be regarded as the founder of modern textual criticism. His greatest single achievement was his work on Manilius’s *Astronomica*, published in two editions of 1579 and 1600. These two editions (a third, enlarged and corrected from Scaliger’s notes, was published in 1655), can be seen as epitomizing the difference
between the subjective eclecticism of earlier editors and the more conservative methodology of the new. As A. E. Housman noted, when the first edition appeared there was no good Manilius manuscript available, and consequently “the transformation which first made Manilius a legible author was the work of Scaliger’s own unaided wits.” But by 1600, the Gemblacensis collation was available, and the conjectures could now be confirmed or rejected according to more strictly bibliographical standards. If we are to accept Housman’s judgment on the results, “no critic has ever effected so great and permanent a change in any author’s text as Scaliger in Manilius” (23). Scaliger had that rare gift of a combination of good taste and immense learning, qualities all editors should possess.

From Scaliger on, the history of textual criticism can be seen to follow two apparently mutually exclusive directions. The first (predominating in the early modern period, from the seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries) is to place the study of the text and the editorial restoration of authorial intentions within the broad discipline of philology, where textual criticism may often be regarded as the summit of philological work, but where it is very clearly only one aspect of a general scholarly enterprise, the restoration of the past under the auspices of Altertumswissenschaft, the science of ancient times. The second movement (predominating from the late nineteenth century to the present day) is to bring an increasingly specialized (and often increasingly technical) competence to the discipline of textual criticism, in fact to regard editing as partly dependent on the application of discoverable and verifiable scientific principles, which may be used to balance, or even lessen, the role of individual criticism in the construction and reconstruction of texts—with unfortunate results for the practice of this criticism. The division I have drawn between the two tendencies is somewhat simplified, for there were scholars in the earlier period whose interest was almost entirely in textual matters and who brought a technical rigor to the practice of textual criticism (Lachmann in his classical editing might fit this description). And, in the twentieth century, there have been editors who have brought a bellettristic rather than a technical disposition to the tasks of textual criticism, and who have resisted the encroachments of “science” upon a tradition which (as already seen) has been as much dependent upon subjective inspiration as it has upon hard bibliographical data. But in general, the division holds.

The old dispensation of Altertumswissenschaft (towards which the increasingly systematic methods of the early German and English philologists were moving) finally could not sustain itself as an organized body of authority once its linguistic core, its critical medium, and its editorial practices had been attacked respectively by structuralist and transformational linguistics, New Criticism and post-structuralist literary theory, and the technical demands of analytical and textual bibliography. Thus, in the first category, language, the linguistic donnée of philology and Altertumswissenschaft was that the proper study of language is in the form of historical linguistics, the arrangement of linguistic characteristics along a linear path of predictable development through such features as sound changes: such diachronic assumptions of the old philology were challenged by Saussure’s concentration on the synchronic structure of a given language, its system of current syntactic coherence rather than on its historical development, and later by Chomsky’s transformational grammar, an attempted analysis of the “deep structure” of grammatical relationships supposedly common to all languages, a further repudiation of the diachronic bias of the historical linguistics of traditional philology.

And in the second category, that of critical medium, the various branches of historical criticism, concerned with the reconstruction of moments in the past and an exposure of their alterity or “otherness” (again dependent on a faith in predictable historical development and the mapping of this development along linear paths) were challenged first by the anti-historical bias of New Criticism, in its attempt to isolate the complexity of textual utterance from such extraneous features as author, audience, and cultural context, and later by the post-structuralist dictum that all writing (écriture) is “always already written,” a weaving of intertextual associations seemingly denying any place for the individual authorial consciousness.

Finally, in the third category, of editorial method, the eclectic divinatio, or “divining” of the truth of a reading through an inspired self-identification with one’s author (a method associated both with consciously bellettristic editing and perhaps unexpectedly with the technically more rigorous Lachmannian system of genealogy) had to confront the new emphasis on bibliography as part of the history of technology, a view promoted by the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century research of the analytical and descriptive bibliographers, particularly in the Anglo-American school of Pollard, Greg, and then Bowers.

As I argue at the conclusion of this chapter, the textual practitioners of the old philology and its heirs in the twentieth century need not have regarded these three-fold assaults as inimical to the business of
textual scholarship and editing. I have, for example, claimed that even deconstruction and traditional textual criticism have much in common ("[Textual]"); and the technical bias of analytical bibliography, while regarded with some suspicion by more humanistic textuists like James Thorpe, could, if used in a sophisticated manner, be illuminating rather than deadening to the practice of criticism, as I hope is shown in Chapter 7, on textual bibliography. But there can be no doubt that the battle lines have been drawn around these causes (and their differences), so that when Tanselle declares in his Rationale of Textual Criticism that "this activity [the "questioning of surviving texts"] is necessarily a historical enterprise" (69), he is consciously aligning himself with the tradition of Altertumswissenschaft against the non-textual critics, those "[P]ersons not interested in taking any of the historical approaches to literature" (70).

The terms of this debate are more characteristic of the twentieth century than they are of the late Renaissance, but the seeds of the dissent are already present in the earlier period, for it is through the determined adoption of the virtues of historicity as against mere human conjecture that the philological movement (especially in Germany) became impatient with the sort of intuitive guesswork characteristic of Erasmus and leaned ever more on the historical "proof" of systems like recension and stemmatics, so much so that Housman's corrective was to accuse the German inheritors of Lachmann's ideas with having mistaken textual criticism for mathematics. "A textual critic engaged upon his business is not at all like Newton investigating the motions of the planets: he is much more like a dog hunting for fleas. If a dog hunted for fleas on mathematical principles, basing his researches on statistics of area and population, he would never catch a flea except by accident. They require to be treated as individuals; and every problem which presents itself to the textual critic must be regarded as possibly unique" (Selected Prose: 132–33).

This type of increased technical specialization of the textual critic has been paralleled by a concentration of editorial activity within one field—indeed by the replacement of the textual dilettante or amateur by the editing professional. As already shown, the textual work of Julius Caesar Scaliger was in practice ancillary to his other literary interests, and even a rigorous classical textuist like Bentley was tempted to stray (with horrifying results in his edition of Milton) outside his specialized classical field. Similarly, while Johnson brought a wide scholarly training to his editing of Shakespeare, this edition was only one of a number of scholarly enterprises during his life.

Lachmann too, famous for his editing of Lucretius as well as for his codification of the stemmatic method for the textual analysis of classical works, also ventured into the vernacular (with, for example, his edition of the Nibelungenlied), and used an entirely different text-critical method for this vernacular project.

In the late twentieth century, however, it is now common to discover that a scholarly edition will have its several elements divided piecemeal among scholars displaying different technical training. There may be a textual editor to provide an authoritative text, an annotations editor to write the historical notes, a glossarist, an indexer, and so on. This is another manifestation of the specialization which has driven textual scholars into disciplinary enclaves from which they no longer speak either to each other or to scholars involved in non-textual activities. Finally, the wide range (by period) of the Bentley's and Lachmann's has been replaced by a concentration on a specific area. There have been some modern textual critics (Fredson Bowers is a prime example, with editions in five centuries, from Marlowe to Nabokov) who have produced editions in several different periods; there have even been scholars (Vinton Dearing, for example, in his work on Dryden and on the New Testament) who have done textual work in apparently unrelated fields. But these are the exceptions, and it is in part to propose a remedy for this situation that this book has been written.

In the account of the textual criticism of the modern period which follows, it is obviously impossible to do appropriate justice to every textual theorist or editor of the last four hundred years whose work has had an effect upon the development or the current status of textual criticism. All we can do is to use selected figures as a means of organizing the major issues which have been debated since the Renaissance. Everybody will get short shrift, but the outline of the problems which the textuists attended to will provide a necessary background to the practical questions of editing to be taken up in the next chapter.

Thus, the career of Nicolaus Heinsius (1620–81) exemplifies well the gradual loosening of the hold of both the textus receptus and the humanists' highly selective collation methods upon textual theory. As Kenney points out, the procedure for collation which Heinsius inherited was that "readings were recorded when they seemed to coincide with the critic's idea of what constituted an improvement, passed over in silence otherwise" (59–60). This highly subjective distinction between "good" and "bad" readings also failed to perceive that an au-
thoritative reading might be carried by an otherwise unauthoritative witness. It was scholars like Heinsius who overcame this prejudice and who therefore turned collation into a much wider-ranging and more comprehensive practice than it had been formerly. No doubt his appointment as traveling acquisitions librarian for Queen Christina of Sweden helped him to develop this position.

Discrimination between potentially good and bad authorities is, of course, one of the major skills that a textual scholar must acquire, and (as suggested earlier), it was greatly assisted by the Maurists' investigation of diplomatics (the handwriting of official state documents), whereby the various scripts—and even the specific hands—of a manuscript could be placed on an historical continuum. In the early modern period, the major figures associated with such discriminations are Mabillon and Montfaucon, whose work on identifying forgeries gradually began to turn the practice of diplomatics into the critical attitudes of paleography: that is, a competence in accurate transcription of ancient documents led the way for a critical evaluation of the scripts themselves. In a sense, therefore, the paleographic work of the Maurists may almost be seen as the first genuinely philological (i.e. historical) discipline, for it created a secure technical basis for a branch of historical research long before historical linguistics had realized that languages could also be arranged on this linear pattern and even before the genealogy of texts themselves had been fully articulated as an analytical system. The early paleographers made mistakes (some of them famous ones), but they did at least initiate the philological approach which was to be the prevailing scholarly attitude for the next two centuries.

There are, to be sure, some notable exceptions to this general tendency towards technical proficiency and historical methodology, and it would be a misrepresentation of critical history to maintain that a philological procedure can be seen developing consistently from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. Even a generally reliable, and historically persuasive, textual critic like Richard Bentley could swerve violently away from the practices he had adopted elsewhere (in the editing of classical texts) when he came to work on the vernacular. Bentley's notorious invention of the corrupting Milton "amanuensis" has brought him into disrepute among vernacular textual critics, but his *Paradise Lost* edition is not typical of his career at large. It is the Milton, however, which is most interesting to the critic of English literature, textual or literary. By postulating an amanuensis who had—perhaps deliberately—misrepresented what Milton dictated, Bentley was able to indulge in a level of conjecture that he would never have endorsed in his classical work. The theory was that since Milton was blind he could not correct the amanuensis's errors (in fact, that he did not even know what the amanuensis had written), so that the textual critic now had to take up the poet's mantle and restore his text to a more "Miltonic" condition, in a development of the Alexandrian system of analogy at its most extreme.

Bentley's vernacular experiment is not atypical of the prevailing attitude to vernacular texts in his period, however. It is perhaps ironic, for example, that the eighteenth century's most famous textual emendation to the text of Shakespeare is Theobald's conjectural "a' babbled o' green fields" ("he babbled of green fields," in Mistrest Quickly's account of the death of Falstaff in *Henry V*) in place of the apparently nonsensical "a table of green fields;" for Theobald was, for the period, a somewhat conservative critic, and certainly more so than his fellow-editor of Shakespeare, Alexander Pope, who unfairly made Theobald the hero of one version of his satirical *Dunciad*. Theobald's emendation has gained currency, especially in performed versions of the text, in a perfect exemplification of the growth of the authority of a *textus receptus*, for it has no documentary support and yet satisfies the editor's (and reader's) demands that the text should "make sense." It is, therefore, at this basic semantic level, an emendation that "improves" the text, and such an "improvement," while perhaps not as characteristic of Theobald as it was of Pope, who smoothed out the rough verse and imagery of Shakespeare, is virtually the norm in most vernacular scholarly editing before Johnson.

The fact that *King Lear* could be performed for a hundred years and more with a happy ending in which Cordelia survives (as does Lear himself) to marry Edgar is not directly a textual problem (for the real ending of *Lear* was still preserved in contemporary editions), but it is certainly an indication of the general indifference about authorial intention and of the assumption that Shakespeare, Chaucer, and other "natural" poets could greatly benefit from such improvement. Johnson was the first editor of Shakespeare to return the phrase "hugger-mugger" to its place in the text of *Hamlet*, for it had been banished by the neo-classical textual critics on the grounds of its bad taste.

As Donald H. Reiman's recent survey of the editing of the texts of the Romantics has effectively shown ("Four Ages"), this rather patronizing attitude toward the improvement of unlettered poets prevails even in the nineteenth century, when the textual criticism of both classical and biblical texts had long since accepted the very different dis-
pensation of Higher Criticism and Lower Criticism and modern philology, whereby the historical imagination and technical rigor of the biblical and classical editor was to be observed in the supposedly objective treatment of the sacred texts of Western culture as essentially secular objects, and thus susceptible to the vicissitudes of transmission and not therefore to be easily returned to a pristine state by conscious "improvement." But, as Reiman reminds us, such editors as W. M. Rossetti, in his corrections of Shelley's apparent anomalous texts, were merely carrying out a refinement which was necessitated by the critical attitude (of, e.g., Matthew Arnold) that the Romantics did not "know enough." Such an attitude is clearly going to promote a textual practice in the editing of vernacular texts which parallels the earlier textual treatment of classical texts: a desire for uniformity and polish over roughness and idiosyncrasy, and a consequent elevation of the textual critic to the position of virtual co-author in the attainment of a refined text purged of both historical accretions and of improprieties in the composer.

Until the philological bent of men like F. J. Furnivall and his various creations (e.g., the Early English Text Society) had affirmed vernacular textual criticism as an essentially historical activity, it was inevitable that undocumented (and undefended) conjecture should be the prevailing practice in the editing of vernacular texts. In a recent study ("Logic"), Lee Patterson has convincingly shown that this suspicion of mere documents is a direct growth from the Romantic and post-Romantic rejection of the historical document in favor of the "transcendent meaning" to which the document (even an authorial holograph) is merely a witness. As Patterson points out, this strange discrepancy between the nineteenth-century philology of classical editing and the "Romantic" editing of vernacular literature is perfectly exemplified in the career of Lachmann himself, for his famous Lucretius edition is completely circumscribed by fidelity to a document (in this case the reconstructed archetype, whose physical features Lachmann claimed to be able to delineate perfectly from the imposition of his system of charting genealogical filiation, even to the extent of determining the exact positioning of text on the folios of this non-extant manuscript). Beyond the archetype Lachmann would not go, and this reticence is shown visually in his disciple Maas, who charts the various relationships that the Lachmann system can demonstrate in lower levels of the transmission of texts, but above the archetype provides only a speculative series of undetermined stages reaching back to the unresolvable features of the author's fair copy, forever beyond the grasp of the Lachmannian textual critic.

But Lachmann's *Nibelungenlied* was, according to Patterson, a testament to a "quest for origins that were by definition incapable of documentation" (83). The use of the technical discipline of stematics could (ironically) have enabled Lachmann to reconstruct one of the poem's two hyparchetypes (the common ancestors of "branches" of the family tree of manuscripts, at one level below the authority of the archetype itself), but as a vernacular Romantic editor he was operating under a different aegis and in the case of the national German epic preferred to reject the provable documentary compromise of the hyparchetype in favor of the unprovable but more emotionally and ethically satisfying attractions of the distant Ur-text.

As already suggested, the gap between vernacular editing and classical is made even more apparent by considering that it was in the same early and mid-nineteenth century that the textual critics of the Bible (and particularly of the Old Testament) had, like their colleagues in classical studies, finally broken with the "quest for origins" and had learned to settle for a text that would derive its authority from a diligent linguistic and historical analysis of the extant documents rather than from an inspired leap beyond archetype or inferred manuscript. This position was best exemplified in Eichhorn's *Introduction to the Old Testament* (1780–83), and its immediate result is the realization that the Old Testament is, as a text, no different from any other which has been copied and recopied and whose original features (if there ever were any) are now irrecoverable (see Patterson 76–77).

The textual criticism of Eichhorn and his followers is therefore to be distinguished from the unquestioning acceptance of religious texts by commentators, exeges, and critical interpreters who very much take their text "on faith." This secularization of biblical criticism became the norm for biblical textual work from the mid-nineteenth century on and can even be observed in the textual editing of a "popular" (although quite scholarly) edition of today—the *Anchor Bible*. For example, having established through a close study of the text and transmission of Revelation that the author was John the Baptist and that parts of the book (including its first three chapters) were a later "Christian" addition, the Anchor editor J. Massyngberde Ford reorders the text so that it now begins with the traditional chapter four (and with the rather nonsensical words, "After these things, I looked..."). The textual proof in this case renders the received, sacred text curiously fragmentary and esthetically unsatisfying, but so great is the confidence in linguistic and historical demonstration, that
protecting the very integrity of the text becomes less important than proudly displaying its corruptions as a document.

This influence of the late results of secular criticism in a popular study shows that the *textus receptus* as an authority has indeed retreated in biblical textual criticism, and compares rather ironically with the unexpected opposite phenomenon in some twentieth-century editing of Shakespeare. For example, while the Oxford Shakespeare accepts the "versioning" implications of the fragmentation of *King Lear* into two different plays, and presents them as two separately edited texts, such implications are shied away from in other Shakespearean editing, for example J. Dover Wilson's New Cambridge edition of *Love's Labour's Lost*, despite the weight of bibliographical evidence that Wilson himself brings to the textual argument. He produces an elaborate analytical bibliographical demonstration (resting upon the measuring of lines in the putative authorial manuscript, and on the typical proofing methods of the time) that a section of dialogue in the play was in fact intended for excision by Shakespeare, but that the printer failed to heed the author's wishes (116–24). But such evidence notwithstanding, the pull of the *textus receptus*, and (one assumes) the presence of a bardolatrous inability to jettison anything that Shakespeare wrote, results in Wilson's retaining the canceled passage in his edition, countermarching his own proof (22). In this case, unlike the Ford edition of *Revelation*, the sacred text exerts its own power and maintains its esthetic integrity in the face of mere technical demonstration.

Meanwhile, back in the late eighteenth century, biblical criticism's rejection of a search for an "original" version was paralleled by a similar development in classical studies, when F. A. Wolf published his *Prolegomena ad Homerum* in 1795 and ruefully reported that the original text of Homer was (like that of the Old Testament) irrecoverable, no matter how much polishing and "improving" the textual critic lavished on the extant documents. It seems, therefore, that the confidence that the early philological discoveries of the proponents of *Altertumswissenschaft* had encouraged was now yielding to a more realistic sense of the possible rather than the ideal. (The same process, from great enthusiasm for new technological weapons to a realization that the "definitive" text is an illusion, has also characterized the late-twentieth-century employment of analytical bibliography, which began as a panacea for textual ills and gradually became just one more weapon in the textual critic's armory.) The Lachmannian system, with its clearly defined methods and its clearly limited objectives (the resuscitation of the archetype, but not the author's fair copy) was soon to reinforce this sense of limited, but achievable, editorial aims, and (at least in Germany) ossified into an orthodoxy that enshrined a conservative devotion to technical procedure over enlightened conjecture. Lachmann's great contribution to textual theory was not the *stemma codicum* (the family-tree of extant manuscripts and "inferred"—but lost—witnesses), for he never constructed one, not even for his famous Lucretius. Rather it was the theoretical separation of the two stages of approaching the text: first, *recension* (recension) or the charting of variants (which can then translate into "true" readings and "errors"); and second, *emendatio* (emendation, often having to resort to a third stage, *divinatio*, divination), or the rectification of such error—all with the end of reconstructing the physical features of a witness that the editor does not have access to (the archetype).

The Twentieth Century

As later critics like Housman, Bédier, Pasquali, Kane, Donaldson, and others were to point out (particularly in the latter two's for the false securities of recension in highly corrupt transmissions), the Lachmann genealogical arrangement of witnesses does have certain logical weaknesses and does perhaps encourage a timidity on the part of the editor. For example, the recognition of the direction that a variant moves along (from exemplar to copy and from error to correction or from correct to corrupt reading) of necessity assumes that one can easily tell which is the "error" and which the genuine reading. The problem is that this evidence (employed to determine which are "good" manuscripts and which "bad") is then used to disallow readings from the "bad" manuscripts and to welcome those from the "good," in a perfect exemplification of circular reasoning. As Housman put it, in his general disdain for the insipid logic to which late Lachmannism had fallen: "To believe that wherever a best MS. gives possible readings it gives true readings, is to believe that an incompetent editor is the darling of Providence, which has given its angels charge over him lest his sloth and folly should produce their natural results and incur their appropriate penalty. Chance and the common course of nature will not bring it to pass that the readings of a MS. are right wherever they are possible and impossible wherever they are wrong; that needs divine intervention" (36). Furthermore, once the "best" text has been determined, the Lachmann system encouraged in its less-adept practitioners a fidelity to documentary evidence that in-
furiated Housman, who accused the Germans of hanging onto the readings of a manuscript like hope to an anchor (53). Lachmann had wanted to go further than merely identifying the extant witness that stood in the "highest" position on the stemma: from comparing the reading of several such witnesses, it should be possible to arrive at the reading which certainly lay in the archetype. But since this was (by admission and design) not demonstrably the reading of the author’s fair copy, Housman and other (more conjectural) critics of the later twentieth century have tended to find the “backtracking” of the Lachmann stemma up to the archetype as a wasted journey. Why not simply begin conjecture at a lower level on the tree, if the end-product of the construction of the stemma is still corrupt? But Housman reserved his greatest scorn for conservatives using “language less as a vehicle than as a substitute for thought,” who were “readily duped by . . . ‘scientific criticism’ or ‘critical method’” (Selected Prose: 37), and who consequently would not even go as far as the archetype.

Joseph Bédier’s criticism of the Lachmann method was rather different: not that it was conservative or encouraged textual laziness, but that it was fraudulent. He found that the great majority of stemmata constructed by the Lachmannians resulted in a two-branch pattern, whereby the editor then simply had to choose between a “right” and a “wrong” reading, a “good” and a “bad” manuscript. He felt that the Lachmannians were deliberately avoiding the confrontation with a three- or four-branch stemma since this would destroy the apparent technical basis for their system by throwing them back on conjecture (i.e., by what system of “error” or genealogy does one deal with the radiation of multiple authorities, the production of many witnesses by the repeated copying of the same exemplar, rather than with simply the neat dichotomy of two divergent variants?). Actually, later apologists for Lachmann (e.g., Maas in his Textual Criticism) did include such radiating models, but it remains true that the Lachmannian system could not effectively deal, for example, with any sort of horizontal “cross-fertilization” of lines of descent (as opposed to the expected vertical dissemination of the standard Lachmannian stemma), whether by conflation (a copyist’s working from two exemplars at the same time) or by contamination (a copyist’s incorporation of remembered readings from one version while actually copying from another exemplar). In fact, in the more sexist climate of the Twenties, Maas was able to get away with remarking that the (impossible and unacceptable) mapping of contamination on a stemma was the genealogical equivalent of introducing female descent into family trees (!), technically a pertinent analogy but doubtless fueling some of the recent feminist dissatisfaction with the paternalistic pretensions of orthodox recension-based textual criticism, with its privileging of “correct” reading over “error” and its repudiation of variation itself as an improper corruption of direct monogeneous descent.

There is an irony, however, in Bédier’s having decided that, because the genealogical system did not work honestly (or was not practiced honestly), the editorial prerogative should be curtailed. Bédier’s cure for the ills of the Lachmannian system was to suggest that once having established—by linguistic, historical, codicological or other grounds—that a particular manuscript best represented the author’s wishes, this manuscript (or “best-text”) should thereafter be followed religiously. Bédier’s position is, of course, a version of the old Per- gamanian doctrine of “anomaly,” except that through a perverse logic, he believes it possible to judge manuscripts by their ability to fulfill authorial preferences and yet then supposes that these preferences are otherwise unknowable, as far as emending the text is concerned. There is therefore a further irony in Bédier’s “best-text” theory having duplicated (by a different intellectual and scholarly route) the “best-text” rationale which some of the more timid (or non-conjecturalist) Lachmannians had employed once the mechanics of recension had arranged rival witnesses of a complex tradition in their putative genealogical relationships: such Lachmannians (with their anchors of hope) were, as already shown, best-text editors of the Bédier stamp avant la lettre.

Rather than taking refuge in another form of bibliographical surety (the best text), such critics as Pasquali and George Kane and E. Talbot Donaldson have emphasized the necessarily subjective element of textual decisions, and particularly the requirement that each variation be judged on its own merits. Pasquali was uneasy about the wholesale importation of German stematic theory into the editing of vernacular as well as classical works, and, in his critique of the highly theoretical Lachmannism of Maas’s Textual Criticism in the Storia della tradizione e critica del testo (1934), he even attacked the basic Lachmannian assumptions about error and downward or divergent variation, calling into question the value of the hierarchical structure on which stematics was based and pointing to the system’s inability to deal with contamination. His general thesis was that history (and thus the history of transmission) is not neat and tidy as the Lachmannians would have it, but complex and human. The problems of transmission were thus not to be solved by the pseudo-scientific dog-
ma of recension.

The work of Kane and Donaldson on the text of *Piers Plowman* takes a similar view, for after having tested the applicability of the recension method on the manuscripts of the A-text, Kane came to the conclusion that the patterns discoverable in individual variations did not match the patterns of putative affiliation for the documents conceived as complete witnesses, and thus the only solution was to edit each variant separately according to a demonstrable difference between the usus auctoris and the usus scribendi. This method, which became known as deep editing, was taken up with increasing vigor and enthusiasm in Kane and Donaldson’s editing of the B-text, to much acclaim and condemnation. The problem with deep editing is its elevating of the “mistrust of texts” to a doctrine as intransigent as recension or best-text theory, as critics like David Fowler have demonstrated. Thus, believing that Langland always wrote metrically (i.e., alliterative) perfect lines, Kane and Donaldson emend a line like “And wepen when I shulde slepen though whete brede me faile” to “werchen” instead of “slepen,” since this emendation creates a correct three-stress accent on w. They always have subtle critical arguments to back up their individual decisions (in this case, that the arguably scribal “slepen” is caused by “rhyming inducement” of the previous “wepen” and by the influence of a nearby Latin tag, lacrimae nocte), but these arguments themselves depend upon an acceptance of the specific sorts of distinction between authorial and scribal usage that this form of deep editing depends on anyway.

In the other direction (toward mechanical system and away from individual judgment) another reaction against the Lachmann system was initiated by Dom Henri Quentin, who, after working with the particularly intractable conditions of New Testament textual transmission, came to the conclusion that the problem lay in the apparent objectivity of the “recension” stage of stemmatics. He proposed that, instead of trying to discriminate an error from a genuine reading, the editor produce a so-called positive critical apparatus, in fact not a critical apparatus in the conventional sense at all, but an arrangement of manuscript evidence dependent upon a concordance table of readings grouped in threes. Within any three divergent readings, if two agreed against the third, then according to Quentin, the third could not stand as intermediary between the other two. Quentin’s basic argument therefore replaces the critical adjudication of variants by a branch of statistics (or distributional analysis, as it was to be called).

Statistical or distributional evidence is obviously of potentially great value in editing (it has been used, for example, in David Vieth’s editing of Rochester and in Harold Metz’s and M. W. A. Smith’s stylistic analysis of disputed Shakespeare plays). But a problem may be that the variants (particularly in Quentin’s relatively unsophisticated methodology) are not given any value—they are merely counted. One of the basic principles of traditional textual criticism is that “[witnesses] should be weighed, not counted,” and while the sheer volume of evidence in a system like Quentin’s might, through its accumulation of the same relationships over and over again, provide statistically convincing genealogies, Quentin does not discriminate between a reading that can be produced independently (and therefore repeatedly, by accidental recurrence) and one that must demonstrate a close affinity between manuscripts sharing the same reading. Indeed, there are those who would declare that all variants are finally independent of each other and of any rigidly imposed system for charting their relations, for one can never be sure that two scribes could not have produced the same “error” from the same exemplar, only to have the exemplar’s reading restored by another scribe, and in the process destroying the premises of Quentin’s argument.

Two additional modifications to filiation theory or the mapping of family descent may be briefly mentioned before closing this section. The first is Greg’s algebraic formulae used to chart possible filiation in his *Calculus of Variants*. Like Lachmann’s and Maas’s, Greg’s system will not readily admit of “cross-fertilization of collaterals” (what has been called elsewhere, “horizontal” or “convergent” variation, as opposed to “vertical” or “divergent” dissemination). That is, there may be variants shared within a “variation group,” all of whose members must belong to the same branch of the stemma, but not across the filiation pattern, from one branch (or “collateral”) group to another. Greg is primarily interested in defining the concept of the “exclusive common ancestor,” or the latest ancestor common to a variation group within one branch of the stemma and to no other—unless the two groups at the top of two branches also share features, in which case these features would presumably descend from the exclusive common ancestor at the head of the entire tree (what Lachmann would have called the archetype). Greg represents this idea of the exclusive common ancestor with a formula (xA) rather than by a diagrammatic position, as in the Lachmann stemma. Thus, the exclusive common ancestor of a group of two witnesses (B and C) in which readings largely agree could be expressed by the formula xA’BC, a formula which can then be simplified by designating this exclusive
common ancestor by the Greek letter beta (β). If another variation group, comprising the witnesses B and C, can be shown to share certain features with the A of the previous formula (so that an exclusive common ancestor, designated by the Greek letter alpha (α), could be postulated for the convergence of both variation groups), then this relationship can be expressed by the formula xA’A(BC), and so on, with increasingly more complex formulations.

The great virtue of Greg’s system is that it can efficiently and accurately represent relationships which might be only ambiguously traceable through a conventional geometric (i.e., stemmatic) pattern, but its weakness is its forbidding mathematical surety, from which editors seem to have retreated. Thus, while some later theorists (notably Vinton Dearing) have praised Greg for the originality of his symbolic method, and while his theory has found some advocates, I know of no practical editing which has been entirely conducted according to the precepts of the Calculus. Greg’s book is unfortunately symptomatic of a type of textual criticism which is more enamored of the system it constructs than of the results it might create, and I can only assure the reader that my brief account, necessarily synoptic, simplifies much of the detailed algebraic demonstration upon which Greg’s calculus depends.

It is indeed Greg’s disciple Vinton Dearing and his Principles and Practice of Textual Analysis which are the last exhibits in this survey of filiation theory. Dearing attempts to construct models for filiation using the arguments of symbolic logic, but unlike Greg’s and Lachmann’s, his system (at least at an entry level) will support convergent variation or contamination. Thus, he postulates the “ring” as the model for such variation, a ring being defined as a “closed sequence in which all elements are intermediary” (95).

\[
\begin{align*}
A &\rightarrow B \rightarrow CD \\
A &\rightarrow F \rightarrow E \\
4x &\rightarrow vx \rightarrow vy \\
4z &\rightarrow wz \rightarrow wy
\end{align*}
\]

As the diagram of a typical Dearing ring shows, what this means is that a “sequence” of witnesses (denominated by the conventional sigla A, B, C, D, E, F, and G) can be formed into a ring (rather than a simple line) because of certain shared features: thus witness A contains the reading ux, witness B the reading vx, witnesses CD the readings vy, witness E the reading wy, witness F the reading wz, and witness G the reading uz. Since each one of these readings “overlaps” with readings in witnesses on either side (u is in both A and G, x in both A and B etc.), the overlapping readings form the witnesses into a circle or ring and there is no obvious point at which this ring can be broken. To the concept of the ring, therefore, Dearing adds that of the principle of parsimony (derived from logic), whereby the textual analyst would never rewrite two variations when rewriting one will represent the filiation, and it is this principle which Dearing then uses to break (i.e., “rewrite”) the rings as lines. The concept of parsimony is similar to the “simplification” principle of Archibald Hill (“Some Postulates”), who suggests that in pure distributional theory, (where the concept of “error” should properly be replaced by the neutral “addomission,” a term which simply acknowledges the variation without ascribing value to it), stemmata with complex or multiform stages of genealogy should be replaced by simplified models, so that the fewer stages of transmission that a model needs to explain the extant forms, the more efficient that model becomes. Using parsimony as his principle of simplification, Dearing is unwilling to allow the convergent variation to be sustained where it can be broken into, and the rule for the breaking of rings is that it should take place in “decreasing order of the strengths of their weakest connections” (97).

All of this sounds fine as a theoretical procedure, but rather like Quentin’s arrangement of threes, it runs into the issue of the value of a connection. For example, if the x held in common by A and B is, say, a noun (the subject of a sentence, even), is this weaker or stronger than the u between A and G, which might be perhaps, the verb? Where and how should convergent spelling be evaluated? What do we do about punctuation? Or word-division? It is not that Dearing does not have some answers for some of these questions, but rather that the answers may very well change from text to text, according to the demonstrable authorial preferences in these matters. But these preferences are themselves (we assume) embedded in the “connections” that are to be broken, so that the argument again becomes (like Lachmann’s and like the symbolic model Dearing has chosen to represent his system), a ring.

The important work of Lachmann, Quentin, Greg, and Dearing is significant in its placing emphasis upon the features of the text itself rather than upon the characteristics of the “carriers” of that text—the manuscripts and printed books from which the evidence for a calculus or a ring might be drawn. Dearing has moreover declared that this study of transmission from the internal features of the text should be separate from that of the bibliography of books and has called the study textual analysis (rather than “textual criticism”). It is a useful
term, as long as it is not employed to sanctify the practice it describes as preferable to or more authoritative than other types of analysis, for textual scholarship at large must comprehend not only the content of the text but its bibliographical nature. And it is the material, hard bibliographical side of textual scholarship that has, in the last century, advanced most in vernacular scholarship, and it is that topic that must be dealt with next.

As already noted, it was largely the twin ancient disciplines of biblical studies and classics which together were in the vanguard of textual theory up to the mid-nineteenth century. The editing of vernacular texts either lagged far behind these two, borrowed from their ideologies or practices, or promoted a rival textual dispensation (e.g., “Romantic” editing, in Patterson’s sense) which consciously rebelled against the traditions of the classicists and biblicists. But towards the end of the nineteenth century, an independent movement in the scholarship of English documents led to Anglo-American textual criticism taking the lead in modern textual theory.

The beginnings of this movement can be observed first in medieval studies, but by the early twentieth century the center of gravity moved to the Renaissance (particularly drama), and since then has also encompassed other fields, most notably English and American literature of the nineteenth century. These beginnings can be traced to the philological aims of F. J. Furnivall, and particularly to his plan for a new English dictionary on “historical” principles. This New English Dictionary—NED—(or Oxford English Dictionary—OED—as it was to become, and NOED, or New Oxford English Dictionary in its latest, electronic, manifestation, see Chapter 1) was to be based on a study of original documents (manuscripts and printed books) where the history of the language could be observed in practice. The plan therefore involved a vast research effort by hundreds of volunteer workers, to read the sources and to record the usages. The OED was therefore related to the similarly national enterprise of reproducing a number of these significant documents in generally conservative documentary editions. For history, this was the Rolls Series and for literature, the Early English Text Society’s publications. In fact, the EETS (another brainchild of Furnivall’s) was specifically intended to provide the materials on which the OED would be built, although it has long outlasted its original purposes. The Malone Society, with its series of diplomatic reprints of Renaissance dramatic documents, continued the work of EETS in a later field.

The inherent documentary conservatism of EETS and the Rolls Series was not, however, paralleled elsewhere in the editing of medieval texts, which still tended to be produced either under a vaguely stemmatic dispensation or with the old mixture of editorial whimsy and enlightened conjecture. Even Furnivall could be a remarkably idiosyncratic editor, as when he selected Harley 4866 as his copy-text for his edition of Hoccleve’s *Regement of Princes* because it had “the best portrait of Chaucer” (xvii). Not all nineteenth-century medievalists were quite as cavalier as Furnivall: the scholarly record of such figures as Macaulay on Gower, Henry Bradshaw, Frederick Madden, and W. W. Skeat would be enough to demonstrate the sense of discrimination and adjudication which characterized much editorial work in the century. But much of this work has (inevitably) been superseded, and finally it is in the linguistic “philological” presentation of cumulative documentary evidence in the volumes of EETS and the pages of the *OED* that the nineteenth-century medievalists made their enduring contribution to scholarship.

The major change in editorial method came from the Renaissance, and (like its medieval counterpart) it begins in enumerative and descriptive bibliography, rather than in editing itself. Two of the mileposts have in fact already been mentioned in the chapter on enumerative bibliography: Gordon Duff’s descriptive catalogue of the typeforms of English incunabula in 1896, and Robert Proctor’s index to the incunabula of the British Museum and the Bodleian Library (1898). These enumerative/descriptive catalogues were an extension into English materials of the practices of the German incunabula bibliographers, and (together with the equally significant bibliographical work of Pollard and Redgrave in the original *Short-Title Catalogue*) promoted an attention to the physical characteristics of early printed books which was to develop into the “science” of analytical bibliography. The major editorial manifesto of this movement was R. B. McKerrow’s *The Works of Thomas Nashe* (1904–10), paralleled by the contemporaneous bibliographical study of the Shakespeare texts in Alfred Pollard’s *Shakespeare Folios and Quarto* (1909), and the later *Prolegomena for the Oxford Shakespeare* (1939), also by McKerrow. The publications of the Malone Society were (as already observed) one of the main vehicles for the documentary presentation of the new bibliographical evidence, and for many years (1906–39), the general editor of the Society’s publications was W. W. Greg, who became the central theorist of the the editorial implications of the “new” bibliography. The basic bibliographical training required in incipient scholars of the new bibliography was enshrined in McKerrow’s textbook.
An Introduction to Bibliography for Literary Students (1927, first edition), which became the vade mecum of bibliography until it was largely superseded (or updated) by Philip Gaskell’s A New Introduction to Bibliography (1972), which interestingly drops the “for literary students” qualification.

What all these editions, bibliographical studies, manifestos, and textbooks have in common is a concentration upon the physical form of the book in which a text appears. Using the technical information which was gradually accumulated about the history of early printing, the bibliographers of the new dispensation seemed to be moving textual studies firmly into the camp of technology. But they were not all equally sanguine about the possible results of such a move, and McKerrow in particular had serious reservations about a technological approach usurping the traditional territory of “textual criticism.” His phrase “for literary students” was perhaps to be taken more seriously than one might suppose, since it betrays his assumption that while bibliography was an essential tool in textual study, the results of this study should be better, more authoritative, literary texts. All too often in the mid- and late twentieth century, one senses that analytical bibliography became an independent discipline, with no ultimate literary responsibilities (and ironically this can be paralleled by the attempts of the literary critics to make criticism equally independent of literature). Gaskell’s dropping of “for literary students” is clearly a sign of the times.

In the later twentieth century, the two major apologists for the influence of analytical bibliography were W. W. Greg and Fredson Bowers. Indeed, it is quite proper to speak of a “Greg-Bowers” school of textual scholarship, for Bowers consciously saw his own work as a continuation of the principles of Greg, to whom he dedicated his authoritative Principles of Bibliographical Description in 1949 and whose bibliography of printed drama he was extending at the time of his death in 1991. Bowers was a great proselytizer, partly by his own example in producing editions on Greg-Bowers principles (for, as already noted, he edited works in all of the post-medieval periods) and partly by the influence of such organs as the annual Studies in Bibliography (which Bowers edited from its first volume in 1948 until 1991, in the latter years assisted by the eighteenth-century scholar David Vander Meulen) and through the general guiding principles of the Modern Language Association’s Center for Editions of American Authors and the somewhat less restrictive attitudes of its successor, the Center (later Committee) for Scholarly Editions.

It is impossible in a few short lines to do adequate justice to the enormous output and scholarly influence of Greg and Bowers, for their positions—on copy-text, on critical editing, on the application of the principles of analytical bibliography—have been the focus of most of the scholarly debate in Anglo-American studies over the last half-century. A brief summary will have to suffice. Although he was active as editor, as bibliographer, and as textual critic, Greg’s experience in editing texts with complex traditions was limited to Dr. Faustus and The Masque of Gypsies, and his single most influential contribution to textual scholarship came in a short theoretical essay he wrote towards the end of his life—“The Rationale of Copy-Text,” published in Bowers’s Studies in Bibliography. To be fair, Greg did not conceive of the essay as primarily theoretical, but rather as a practical editorial response to the documented conditions of English printing of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; but the essay has been used as the focus for a long debate on principle as well as practice.

Greg’s basic position in this essay was to call into question a widely held textual assumption that the most authoritative copy-text for a scholarly edition should be the last edition published during the author’s lifetime. This assumption rested on an undocumented (and often undocumentable) theory that it was the normal practice for authors personally to see all editions of their works through the press. It was clear that in the Renaissance this was rarely so (particularly for drama) and that when an author did assume any prerogative (as in the famous case of Ben Jonson’s Works of 1616) this was regarded as an aberration (again, particularly for drama). To overcome this problem and to recognize the actual circumstances of publication in the period, Greg proposed that a distinction be made between what he called substantives (the actual words, or the “meaning” of a text) and accidentals (the spelling, punctuation and so on, or the “surface features” of a text). Greg suggested that wherever possible, the editor of a Renaissance work should use an authorial manuscript (presumably itself the copy-text for the first edition or of some pre-publication state of the text) as copy-text for the “accidentals,” and that later states of the text (usually including the first edition) should then be consulted for substantive emendation of this copy-text, wherever it could be shown that later substantive changes had indeed been introduced by the author.

This suggestion of a “divided” authority in copy-text (one text for accidentals and possibly several others for imported substantives) then resulted in the production of “eclectic” editions bearing features from
various witnesses, in what became known as the "text that never was" (but by implication, ought to have been, in the best of all possible worlds, since it constructed authorial intention in despite of the testimony of individual documents). In other words, the Greg theory was a late blossoming of Alexandrian analogy, the construction of putative authorial usage out of the collation of multiple witnesses, and was a deliberate repudiation of the prevailing best-text procedures favored by other editors, including McKerrow, who was very reluctant to emend his copy-text from other sources. This change in philosophy, coupled with the selection of copy-text for its accidentals rather than its substantives, engendered an animated, sometimes vociferous response, which is still going on.

For example, while Greg's principle was (initially) endorsed by the CEAA editions and applied by Bowers in the editing of Renaissance texts, it met stiff resistance from editors in other fields (including nineteenth-century American fiction, which had been the focus of the first CEAA editions). While the editorial work and the theoretical essays of Bowers and G. Thomas Tanselle have promoted Greg's theory (so successfully, indeed, that much of the reaction against Greg was motivated until comparatively recently by the apparent acceptance of his essay as the current "orthodoxy" of textual scholarship, and a consequent resistance to its hegemony), there has been an increasingly vocal displeasure with the supposed expansionist aims of the Greg-Bowers school. Some of this displeasure can be dismissed as mere ill-will, such as Edmund Wilson's notorious attack on the CEAA editions, "The Fruits of the MLA," where his ill-informed mud-slinging seems to rest largely upon his rancor at having his own proposal for a series of "reader's" editions of American classics turned down by the National Endowment for the Humanities, while the MLA's proposal for "scholarly" editions was at first well-funded. Some measure of the general anti-academic and anti-scholarly tone of the essay can be observed in that its favorite term of abuse seems to be the word "professor." Wilson was an amateur and proud of it, but some of the other attacks have come from professionals. (A later irony is that Wilson's desire for an inexpensive uniform series of reprints of American literature is now very much under way—The Library of America—but that the direct NEH support for the MLA Committee on Scholarly Editions has disappeared, and support to the editions themselves generally dwindled.)

Thus, by the third quarter of the twentieth century, it would be fair to say that the dominant mode of Anglo-American textual criticism, institutionally and academically, was the copy-text school of eclectic editing designed to produce a reading clear-text whose features were a fulfillment of authorial intentions by the selection of authorially sanctioned substantive variants from different states of the text, and whose copy-text was selected on the basis of its accidentals being as close as possible to authorial usage (and therefore normally a manuscript rather than a later printed edition, if such a manuscript existed). The success of the eclectic method can be demonstrated by the fact that, with very few counter-examples (the Cornell Wordsworth and the Harvard Emerson), virtually all of the three hundred or so volumes endorsed by the CEAA or CSE seal of approval have been constructed on Greg-Bowers principles of eclecticism and copy-text theory. Moreover, the influence of Bowers's editions, and of his voluminous theoretical writings, can be shown on many fronts: for example, Jo Ann Boydston, current chair of the CSE, testifies that it was the authority of Bowers's essay "Some Principles for Scholarly Editions of Nineteenth-Century Authors" that led her to begin her own monumental edition of John Dewey on similar principles ("Collected Works"). The combined efforts of Bowers (e.g., "Greg's Rationale," "Multiple Authority," ) and Tanselle (e.g., "Greg's Theory," "Editorial Problem," "Editing of Historical," "External Fact," "Recent Editorial," "Historicism," Rationale, Textual Criticism Since Greg, "Textual Criticism and Literary Sociology") in a series of comprehensive and encyclopaedic surveys of editorial problems, again enlarged the purview of the eclectic, copy-text school.

But things change, and the last decade or so has seen a major shift in the disposition of textual criticism as practiced on works in English and other European languages: indeed, much of the change in Anglo-American textual criticism has been the result of the influence, direct or indirect, of Continental theories and practices, just as has occurred in literary theory and criticism.

The Current Debate

Even within the Greg-Bowers camp, it would be a mistake to assume a monolithic orthodoxy in its adherents. Thus, while generally accepting the basic principles of dual/divided authority and eclectic editing in multiple text traditions, Tanselle has distanced himself from other features of Greg's theory, for example, finding the terms "accidentals" and "substantives" to be misleading and often untenable in
their implication of a firm distinction in all cases. Similarly, the opposition to Greg-Bowers has been far from united and represents various interests.

James Thorpe's *Principles of Textual Criticism* (1972) has become one of the best-known "literary" (even "belteristic") rejections of Greg-Bowers, largely on his—perhaps mistaken—assumption that the "system" which Bowers had articulated in his *Principles of Bibliographical Description* and the "theory" which Greg had proposed in his "Rationales" were too scientific, too technical, and too removed from the actual circumstances of composition of literature. Philip Gaskell's position rests less on these philosophical grounds and more on his interpretation of the printing and publishing history of post-Renaissance English literature. In brief, he holds that since most authors expected their accidental to be corrected or modified or regularized by the publisher, an acceptance of the authorial manuscript as copy-text would give us only a consciously unfinished state of intention. Thus, while Gaskell would support the use of manuscript for copy-text in works not intended for publication (e.g., diaries, letters, and so on)—indeed, what else is there?—he maintains that the act of publication presupposes that the author has willingly endorsed all the changes in his text that this involves (New Introduction: 339-40). Now, it is clear that this division of opinion does result in a philosophical distinction after all, no matter how much it may appear to be grounded in strict bibliographical data. And much of the most recent debate has been concerned with this question of "intention" (and particularly "final intention") and how best to recognize it, represent it or reject it in favor of other competing ideologies.

Tanselle, for example, believes that the textual critic should be very cautious about accepting the mere facts of the subsequent history of the text of a work as indicating that the author willingly accepted (or even "intended") these later conditions. In his edition of Melville's *Typee*, for example, he and his colleagues Hayford and Parker restore the first edition text containing criticism of Christian missionaries in the South Seas, even though Melville expressly agreed that the second edition text, in which large cuts were made to remove the criticism, was a superior work, and the cuts "beneficial." As Tanselle remarks, "There is no question that Melville is responsible for the changes, and in this sense they are 'final'; but they represent not so much his intention as his acquiescence. Under these circumstances, an editor is justified in rejecting the revisions and adopting the original readings as best reflecting the author's 'final intentions'; in fact, to accept the readings which are final in chronological terms would distort that intention. ... In the end, one cannot automatically accept such statements at face value; as in any historical research, statements can only be interpreted by placing them in their context" ("Editorial Problem": 193-94). Clearly, the concept of intention and final intention is more complex than one might imagine.

In a somewhat lighter vein, Gary Taylor confirms that apparently unambiguous protestations on authorial intention must be treated with caution. He muses that we might "hope to find reliable early testimony to Shakespeare's habits of composition. An autograph letter, for instance. 'Dear Anne, I'll be home next week, as soon as I finish revising that old play of mine, *King Lear*. Your loving Willy. London. 1 April 1610.'" But as Taylor goes on to suggest, such documentation may be suspect: "Artists, after all, do, often enough, lie about their work. For all we know, 'revising *King Lear*' might have been Shakespeare's alibi, to cover an adulterous weekend" ("Revising": 296-97).

Taking on the traditional preoccupation with authorial intention, and reacting against what he perceives as an intentionalist privilege given to a Romantic concept of the solitary author creating a work in an "originary moment" of composition, Jerome J. McGann has proposed an alternative view of composition, in which the entire history of the work is a fit subject for textual scholarship, and even posthumous changes by editors, publishers, friends and relations, are to be considered a perfectly valid part of the text read as a social construct. McGann's social textual criticism, appearing in his *Critique of Modern Textual Criticism* and various other writings in the last ten years, has been the major point of contention in recent debate. Emphasizing the inevitably collaborative nature of literature (with an analogy drawn from music, another art in which the receiver is a major element in the construction of meaning), McGann's work has been seen on the one hand as an "unattributed gloss" on the Marxist Pierre Macherey's dictum that "the work is not created by an intention (objective or subjective); it is produced under determinate circumstances" (Sutherland: 581) and on the other as an exemplification of Stanley Fish's "interpretive communities," whereby textual meaning is constructed by a social contract within which the transmitted text operates, rather than by an appeal to the intentions of a now-absent author (Greeley, "Textual and Literary Theory": 11).

There is perhaps an irony in McGann's editorial reputation having been made with his authoritative edition of Byron for Oxford, an edi-
Criticizing the Text

...
that works like Dreiser's *Sister Carrie* and Crane's *Red Badge of Courage*, while altered by their authors under external influence, should best be read in the "censored" versions rather than original manuscript forms, since these censored texts have acquired an independent cultural value outweighing any appeal to the "originary moment." While not endorsing such a specific historical view, the evidence Philip Gaskell assembles in his *From Writer to Reader* emphasizes the social transactions that a text undertakes as it becomes increasingly public property: he demonstrates the "dynamic" of the text by showing examples of the various ways texts have undergone changes, from Harington's translation of Ariosto to Tom Stoppard's *Travesties*, and suggests that there can be no one textual method suitable for dealing with all of them.

This concentration on the variance of texts and an acceptance of their engagement with society can be seen in many textual critics working today—in Derek Pearsall's call for a loose-leaf edition of Chaucer ("Editing Medieval Texts"); in Gary Taylor's insistence on Shakespeare as inveterate reviser ("Revising Shakespeare"); Steven Urkowitz's promotion of multiple-text interpretations of, for example, *Lear* and *Hamlet*, and Michael Warren's edition of the "complete" (i.e., multiple-text) *Lear*; in Peter Shillingsburg's vision of multiple computer-created texts of nineteenth-century novels ("Limits"; "Technology"); in Donald H. Reiman's emphasis on "versioning" rather than final intentions in the editing of the Romantics; in Lafuma and Sellier's separate editing of the two states (la Première Copie and la Seconde Copie) of Pascal's *Pensées* to overcome the false sense of unity and organicism given in earlier editions by Pascal's nephew Étienne Périer; in A. Rossi's insistence that there are three, not one, authorial versions of Boccaccio's *Decameron*; in De Robertis's experimental apparatus for recording multiple authorial variants in Ungaretti's poetry; in the Soviet textology of Dmitrij Lixacev, concentrating on the layers and divergent states of text; in John Miles Foley's computer program HEURO for the continuous construction and reconstruction of Yugoslav oral epic poetry, a medium which would otherwise be arrested by editing; in Hershel Parker's designation of a "New Scholarship" which would promise a "full intentionality" drawn from the multiple, and frequently contradictory, states of many nineteenth- and twentieth-century American authors; and in Philip Gaskell and Clive Hart's publication of a reader's kit (Review of Three Texts) for "repairing the major faults" of *Ulysses* editions, including Hans Walter Gabler's, which is itself an example of the influence of

the genetic school of editing prominent in Franco-German textual criticism (e.g., in editions of Proust, Hölderlin, Kafka, Klopotock, Flaubert, etc.). Genetic editing, uncommon in Anglo-American circles except for the Gabler *Ulysses* and the almost equally notorious Harvard Emerson edition (the focus of much of Wilson's attack on the "barbed wire" of scholarly apparatus that keeps readers away from texts) aims to present the growth and development of texts in a continuous display of variant states, rather than separating the favored "clear text" of the eclectic editions from rejected variants. It is thus a method endorsing process over product, variance and indeterminacy over final authority and the definitive edition.

What all these textual scholars have in common is a reaction against any simplistic imposition of the final intentions principles of Greg-Bowers eclecticism. Instead of postulating a single, consistent, authorially sponsored text as the purpose of the editorial enterprise, they suggest multiform, fragmentary, even contradictory, texts as the aim of editing, sometimes to be constructed ad hoc by the reader. In general, then, the characteristic feature of textual scholarship in the closing years of this century is its democratic pluralism: there is no longer, in Anglo-American editing, at least, any single orthodoxy among textual scholars, although it would have to be admitted that eclectic, intentionalist editions are still being produced more often than any other form, perhaps because it will take some time for practice to catch up with theory.

McGann's theoretical shift from "intention" (an authorial prerogative) to "affect" (a reader's) is symptomatic of a general shift in critical theory from a reliance on an author's imputed meaning to the free play of meaning associated with post-structuralism. This is no accident, for textual criticism participates in the ideological climate as do all other intellectual activities—history, philosophy, science, literature. As I have noted elsewhere ("Textual and Literary Theory": fn. 4 [14-15]), it was not coincidence that the hegemony of the new bibliography and eclectic editing (with its emphasis on the single consciousness of "the text itself" and on the removal of variance to a discrete part of the volume) was virtually co-terminous with that of the New Criticism, with its similar endorsement of the singular "text itself" and its similar desire to resolve tension, irony, and variance in the "well-wrought urn" that was the proper object of critical study. In this way, while not speaking directly to each other, and often seeming to represent markedly different attitudes (to, for example, history and intention), practitioners of the new bibliography of eclectic edit-
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ing and the New Criticism of *explication de texte* reinforced each other’s predispositions in a cultural context that favored close reading of a fixed, definitive text over the irresolution of competing witnesses and competing readers.

These days, it seems that all we have are competing texts and competing readers, and the list of textual critics accepting versions over fixed texts is emblematic of the change. There has thus been a new acknowledgment that textual criticism is not merely a dry, mechanical, tedious investigation of physical fact but, like all other intellectual activities, operates under various theoretical persuasions, which may change from time to time. Much of the important work on textual criticism in the next few years is likely to be in the further exploration of this relation between theory and text. For example, Gary Taylor is working on a study of the historical hermeneutics of editing, tentatively entitled *The Matter of Text*; W. Speed Hill on the humanist antecedents of editing in the vernacular and on the text as scripture; Joseph Grigely on textual criticism and the arts; and James L. W. West III on the editorial “construction” of authorship. The collections of essays on literary and textual theory appearing in the special issue of the journal *Critical Exchange* on *Textual Scholarship and Literary Theory* and in the volume that Philip Cohen has edited (*Devils and Angels*) will doubtless fuel the debate, as will George Bornstein’s edited collection *Palimpsest: Editorial Theory in the Humanities*, Jerome J. McGann’s recent collection of reprinted essays *The Textual Condition* (the title of which is taken from a paper on his social theory of textual criticism delivered at a conference of the Society for Textual Scholarship), and Oliphant and Bradford’s recent editing of the proceedings of the 1989 Texas conference on *New Directions in Textual Studies*, in which the sociological and materialist aspect of text and textuality is very prominent. My own *Theories of the Text* draws all of this discussion into the conceptual and methodological matrix of contemporary theory.

Even critics primarily associated with traditional intentionalism have shown themselves alert to the challenge of theory: Tanselle’s *A Rationale of Textual Criticism*, a version of his Rosenbach lectures published in 1989, is a comprehensive analysis of the ontology of text in various art-forms (cinema, painting, architecture, music, literature, dance), responding in part to F. W. Bateson’s question, “If the *Mona Lisa* is in the Louvre, where are *Hamlet and Lycidas*?” The same question prompts Peter Shillingsburg’s lengthy investigation of ontology in his article “Text as Matter, Concept, and Action,” as it does James McLaury’s article “The Mode of Existence of Literary Works of Art,” the title of which is a direct allusion to Wellek and Warren’s formalist view of the issue in their *Theory of Literature*. It is against this formalist, essentialist, literary, and non-material position which McLaury argues, in his insistence that the ontology of the literary work is as much in its physical form as in its language, a persuasion independently endorsed by McGann’s claim that meaning lies in the “bibliographical codes,” the type, layout, format, paper, etc., just as much as it does in the “linguistic codes,” on which most textual criticism, and particularly textual analysis, has concentrated (“What Is Critical Editing?”).

In another important study (“The Concept of Authorial Intention”), McLaury takes issue with both Thorpe and Tanselle’s definitions of “intention”; but while citing some of the specifically textual and bibliographical critics already mentioned in this chapter (for example, Maas, Bowers, Gaskell, and Hinman), McLaury’s primary frame of reference is to philosophers, aestheticians, and literary theorists. McLaury’s thesis is that E. D. Hirsch is “much the most important figure as far as textual criticism is concerned” and proceeds to claim that neither Tanselle nor Thorpe fully account for the levels and types of intention that Hirsch’s work (for example, *Validity in Interpretation* and *The Aims of Interpretation*) defines in the relations of author, text, and reader/critic/editor. Making, for example, a distinction between the “motives” (which ought not to be within the textual critic’s province) and “intentions” (which might be), McLaury declares that Dickens’ “motives” in accepting the advice of Bulwer Lytton to change the ending of *Great Expectations* are beyond the power of the textual critic to question. All that matters is that we can demonstrate Dickens’s “intention” to make the change, and his “expectation” that these intentions should be carried out by the publisher.

On another front—the much rarer treatment of textual matters, and specifically the problem of intention, by literary theorists rather than by textual critics—Steven Mailloux’s book *Interpretive Conventions* is, like McGann, clearly indebted to Fish’s concept of the “interpretive community” as the determinant of meaning—both in its title and in its reforming of some of the levels of “intention” accepted by textual critics like Tanselle. Thus, where Tanselle accepts Michael Hancher’s term “active intentions” and its definition (“the actions that the author, at the time he finishes his text, understands himself to be performing in the text” [830]), Mailloux suggests that such an accept-
Derrida, and Miller, *Deconstruction and Criticism*. Reversing the hierarchies of their title in his own ("Textual Criticism and Deconstruction"), Tanselle plays in the deconstructors' text with a verve hardly reminiscent of a "strict and pure" bibliographer: he cuts up their text, redefines it, contradicts it, and even rewrites it, in a manner I take ("[Textural] Criticism") to be a classic piece of deconstruction.

Textual scholars are thus confronting many of the critical issues (e.g., interpretation, meaning, authority, textuality) characteristic of other parts of the discipline. Perhaps the most provocative to date has been the attempt by some feminist scholars to interrogate not only the patriarchal canon of received texts but also the ideologies embedded in editions, for example, the status of text and apparatus as "center" and "margins" respectively (see Betty Bennett; Katie King; Brenda R. Silver; Patricia White).

Some of this speculation, especially that reversing the hierarchies of traditional textual components (e.g., truth and error, reading and variant, center and margin) may very well result in editions bearing a non-intentionalist stamp, perhaps following the examples of European geneticism, based on the principles of structuralism. Until a few years ago, the technical constraints of letterpress editions lent themselves quite naturally to the production of definitive, fixed, permanent editions, both on the page and in time, so that eclectic, final editions seemed almost natural for the technical medium. But it is now possible for the textual scholar to produce fragmented, spliced, mutilated, multiform, grafted, or deconstructed texts—doubtless embodying the worst nightmares of New Critic and New Bibliographer alike—and most textual scholars now recognize that there is a natural affinity between the computer and the variable discourses of contemporary textual scholarship, an issue raised more fully in the next chapter.

Donald H. Reiman has characterized the hegemony of the Greg-Bowers method as a "brazen" age of editing "because of the too-sanguine hopes they, at least for a time, entertained about the results obtainable through systematic application of fixed principles to a wide variety of texts" ("Four Ages": 142), and contrasts this mood with the more pragmatic, less systematic work of Tanselle and other interpreters of Greg and Bowers—what he calls an "iron" age of "relatively rough and unpolished texts, allowed to reflect the vagaries of authorial behavior" (251). While he predicted that the texts of the iron age would "rust in time," when he wrote his essay on the "four ages" of editing (a decade ago) Reiman would probably not have fore-
seen that the spread of what he has called “versioning” would not so much rust texts as shatter them. These fragmented shards, uncollected pieces, and unfixed states are doubtless appropriate symptoms of our age (and they re-emphasize the critical role of the textuist in evaluating their relative status), but how shall we nominate this age, after those of gold, silver, brass, and iron? Borrowing from Reiman’s system (itself borrowed from Peacock’s account of poetic history), perhaps we might venture that the right name for this age of brief, open-ended, fissured texts should come from one of those trans-uranium elements created for milliseconds in the fierce collisions of the accelerator.

What fierce collisions may yet come in textual criticism cannot be foreseen, except that the confidence in the perfect applicability of pure technology is unlikely ever to have the seductions it once had in the early days of analytical bibliography. Technology will always be a part of textual criticism, and particularly a part of scholarly editing, as the increased use of electronic aids in everything from optical scanning of texts to indexing and typesetting so forcefully demonstrates. But the criticism aspect of textual criticism is as secure a part of the discipline as at any time since the Alexandrians—perhaps even more so. Earlier this century, A. E. Housman proposed the formula that textual criticism is “the science of discovering errors in texts, and the art of removing them” (Selected Prose: 131), but today, most practicing textual critics would probably insist that art and science are equally mixed in both parts of Housman’s equation.

9

Editing the Text: Scholarly Editing

The design of this book has followed what I believe to be a natural (even an inevitable) narrative—from gaining access to the text in its various forms, to discovering its bibliographical characteristics and interpreting its surface features, to defining its transmissional history. The narrative has moved therefore from enumerative bibliography to analytical and descriptive bibliography, from paleography and typography to historical bibliography and textual bibliography, and on to textual criticism or critical bibliography. Theoretically the process could stop there (and some important theorists in textual studies have been content to do so); but the culmination of textual scholarship is in editing the text, in using all of this information to prepare a version of the author’s work for presentation to a reading public. It is with this task and with the decisions and problems attending it that this book concludes.

The first major decision and distinction to be made is whether the edition is to be critical or non-critical, that is, whether it is to attempt to establish a text (based upon the sort of research described in this book), or whether it is simply to reproduce a text already in existence, and perhaps to use this text as a vehicle for annotation or interpretive criticism.

There is doubtless a place for such non-critical texts, especially where an authoritative scholarly edition of the text has already been produced by a reputable textual critic or critics, and where this text can then serve as the focus for a critical commentary which is perhaps not available in the original edition. This sort of edition (“commentary” is probably the better word) has long been a tradition in classical scholarship, where the line-by-line interpretation of the work in
question is the major purpose of the book. A related form is the variorum critical commentary, where again the text is inherited from some other authority; or in certain cases may simply be the textus receptus as it has been established, modified, and clarified through the history of transmission. The critical variorum (e.g., of Shakespeare) does not pretend to be primarily a work of textual scholarship, but rather seeks to focus on the various critical responses to the text in a cogent and consistent manner (in fact, some variroms of this type do not even include a text in the “edition”, e.g., the Milton Variorum Commentary). In these cases, there is at least no confusion over the scope and purposes of the edition and its text.

Elsewhere, unfortunately, the same clarity of intention is not observed. For example, would-be “editors” may decide simply to make use of an earlier (ideally, out-of-copyright) version of the text because they have neither the time nor the inclination to establish texts for themselves—but may then pass off the resulting editions as if they were genuinely, and newly “critical.” This masquerade often occurs in so-called classroom editions, and happened recently when A. L. Rowe blithely co-opted the old (in fact, very old—1864) Globe edition of Shakespeare as “the most authoritative” version of the text upon which to hang his annotations. The problem (and, it seems to me, the deliberate obfuscation) here is not that Rowe decided to produce a popular annotated Shakespeare, but that he based his annotations on a text which can no longer be regarded as authoritative.

The issue may in some ways reside in the terms conventionally applied to non-critical editions. An “editor” is often thought of as simply the person responsible for preparing a text for publication (indeed, the duties of “editors” working in publishing houses consist almost wholly of acting as liaison between author and publisher/printer). It is not surprising, then, that a person who inherits a text from elsewhere, adds a few notes and a brief introduction, can be spoken of as an “editor.” Even in “strict” bibliography, the term “edition” refers quite properly to the identifiably separate type-setting of any book, whether it is an edition in the text-critical sense or not. Similarly, the text-book “editions” of rhetorics and readers so beloved of English composition teachers are editions only in the sense that somebody selected the essays, obtained permission to reprint, and then probably wrote a student’s introduction and invented some interpretive questions on each essay. (Virtually the same comments could doubtless be applied to scholarly Festschriften and other collections, which may occasionally be called “editions”). The printer’s copy for both such editions is almost invariably the pages of the base text employed, with no further correction. Let us agree, therefore, that for the purposes of this book on textual scholarship, these editions are not genuine editions (even non-critical ones), and turn to those which are.

In addition to the textual commentaries mentioned earlier, the most important type of non-critical edition is one which seeks to present a faithful version of a single document, with only minimal textual involvement by the editor. The most faithful of all (at least theoretically) is the photographic reprint, which presents a technically exact—and, one trusts, unaltered and unretouched—facsimile of the original. This type of edition is for obvious reasons most commonly associated with manuscripts, where the scribal idiosyncrasies of, for example, abbreviation marks, letter- and word-spacing, letter-formation and relative letter-size could perhaps not be accurately displayed in a type-setting. The manuscripts so selected will usually have some specific interest in themselves, either textual or codicological. They may, for example, be the only or the primary documentary witness to a text (e.g., the manuscripts containing Beowulf or Pearl and Sir Gawain and the Green Knight), or they may represent a particularly significant stage in the textual transmission (e.g., the Variorum Chaucer facsimile of the Canterbury Tales Hengwrt manuscript, which provides the base-text for the textual collation in subsequent volumes of the Variorum, or, in the modern period, the edition of The Waste Land manuscript, reproducing both Eliot’s original, and Pound’s annotations and suggestions). Both of these editions usefully provide transcripts of the manuscript material. There is also a thriving interest in purely paleographic or ornamental features, represented in, for example, the popular recent series of Braziller facsimiles of medieval Books of Hours (such as the Limbourg brothers’ Très riches heures and Grandes heures of Jean, Duc de Berry, produced in the richly decorative International Style of the fifteenth century), where the textual interest is clearly minimal. Printed books have also been widely photocopied in facsimile editions, especially where the book has some historical or cultural significance (e.g., the Norton facsimile of the Shakespeare First Folio, or the more recent California facsimile of Shakespeare Quartos). The major difference between a manuscript and print facsimile is that in most cases, the printed book will not be unique, whereas the manuscript will obviously always be. This distinction may allow a slightly greater editorial role in the print facsimile, where, for example, Charlton Hinman’s Norton facsimile is made up of various leaves from leaves containing corrected forms from a
number of copies to create a textual "ideal copy," which is available only in the facsimile, not in any of the individual extant copies.

It should go without saying that, especially in manuscript facsimiles, the photocopy should not be accepted as if it were the original. The facsimile fulfills a valid purpose (esthetic, historical, even scholarly), but it is no substitute for the examination of the manuscript itself, especially where this manuscript is to be the chosen copy-text for a scholarly edition. The use of microfilm has made textual work very much easier than it used to be (especially in reducing travel to out-of-the-way repositories), but a microform edition is not the same thing as reading the manuscript, for reader or editor, who must be able to observe such features as hair-line abbreviation marks often invisible in facsimile, and must sometimes use the evidence of the bibliographical materials of the manuscript (parchment, paper, ink, binding etc.) in making textual decisions: see Chapter 7 for an account of the influence of materials and production on the text.

Next to the photographic facsimile edition in its degree of fidelity to the document stands first the type facsimile and then the diplomatic transcript. The type facsimile attempts to reproduce the actual physical appearance of the original in a different type-setting, by observing such features as the original lineation, type-size and type-face in the reprint. The diplomatic transcript, however, dispenses with any attempt at such scrupulous fidelity to appearance, and concentrates primarily on the textual content of the original, reproducing the exact spelling, punctuation, and capitalization (usually) of the diploma (the document), but transcribing the text into a different type-face, with different lineation (except in verse, of course) and different type-sizes.

Of late, there has been a good deal of argument over the specific editorial practices to be used in this latter form of transcription, and in part this argument rests upon another type of documentary classification. In his analysis of the various distinctions to be made between types of edition and types of document (upon which this present account is in part based), G. Thomas Tanselle notes ("Textual Scholarship") that the editor should distinguish between the treatment accorded documents intended for publication and those which are of a more private nature (for example, personal correspondence, notebooks, etc.). This distinction is a valuable one, and can work well generically in the age of print, where it is usually easy to determine the published state of the text (hastily scrawled notes are clearly private, a printed text of a novel is clearly public, as would also be the author's manuscript fair copy of the novel, or a corrected proof). Tanselle argues, quite properly, that "a scholarly editor has no right to guess what the author would have done if faced with the prospect of publishing [private documents]," and that the editor should therefore transcribe correspondence etc. as is, and not attempt to normalize it for the modern reader (34). This distinction is less clearly drawn, however, in the pre-Gutenberg age, where there are virtually no truly "private" documents (in the sense of personal notebooks or correspondence not intended to be read by anyone but the recipient)—and this is especially so of literary figures having otherwise no historical significance. In this period, all documents are, of course, manuscripts, and while some may be more carefully written than others, one should not assume that the more legible are the more "published." One may argue that a "presentation" copy was obviously intended by its author for publication, but the converse (that a hastily scrawled manuscript represents a non-publishable version) is less easy to maintain with any surety.

But given that a distinction between publishable and private can be arrived at, how does the argument over transcription proceed from there? The most famous debate on this issue in recent years has been that between Tanselle ("Editing of Historical Documents," representing a very strict line in transcriptional fidelity to the surface features of a private document) and a number of American historians, particularly those associated with the editing of the papers of the so-called great white fathers—Adams, Jefferson, and so on. In brief, the historians have felt it necessary to normalize, rationalize (and even modernize) authorial usage in such documents (largely to make them more accessible to a modern reading public—see Robert Taylor), whereas Tanselle and many literary editors (see Cook, "Short") have maintained that private documents should be preserved in transcript as closely as typographically possible to their original features, within the accepted limits of the diplomatic reprint, as opposed to the type-facsimile.

Non-critical editions (as representing one of the most basic of editorial choices) have been dealt with at some length largely because they raise issues which have not been adequately covered already in the previous chapter on textual criticism. (Since non-critical editions by definition do not involve any criticism of the text, their characteristics have not been in the forefront of textual theory, as have the features of critical editions.) But critical editions are clearly more difficult and more costly to produce, and the basic editorial decisions which lead to a successful critical edition should be touched on before
moving on to an account of the actual procedures of editing.

As noted in the previous chapter, one of the major debates in twentieth-century textual criticism has been over the status of authorial
intention and its representation in a critical text. All textual criticism is conjectural at some point, for as soon as the decision to produce a critical text has been made, the editor is faced with critical choices which will depend not only upon certain technical data (e.g., information about the format or imposition of the book) but also upon a subjective interpretation of the available evidence. It has often been
assumed that conjecture is involved only when an editor reconstructs or creates a reading which is not extant in any of the witnesses; but the choice among extant variants is just as critical, and just as ultimately conjectural, as the recreation of a form which happens not to be extant in any of the witnesses. The intentionalist editor is deciding which reading is the more authorial (and is therefore interpreting intention), and in the process presumably rejecting all other readings as unauthoritative (or the cancelled first thoughts of an author). An apparently authorial variant in a document does not in all cases depend for its authority on the characteristics or existence of the document, for if this were so, then works extant in only one manuscript would never be susceptible to editorial emendation—a clearly untenable position for a critical edition, especially where the single witness is a scribal or compositorial copy and therefore inherently corrupt to one degree or another.

So a critical edition demands both criticism and conjecture—the problem is the degree and nature of that criticism. As seen already, the history of textual criticism has often moved between two extreme reactions to criticism and the discovery of authorial intention, one extreme (analogy and eclecticism) believing that correct readings are discoverable given enough information about the texts and enough intelligence and inspiration on the part of the editor, and the other extreme (anomaly and conservatism) believing that conjecture is more likely to represent editorial rather than authorial intention and that consequently the evidence of the documents—and ideally one specific document—should be placed above that of editorial judgment or taste. Both schools involve some criticism, for the analogists maintain that critical discriminations are possible among variant readings from different witnesses, and the anarchist maintain that critical discrimination is possible in selecting the witness to be faithful to. The question is: what system or what rationale may one use to make these discriminations?

As noted earlier, the most famous (and in Anglo-American literary editing, certainly the most dominant) rationale offered in the twentieth century has been Greg’s, for its division of authority between substantives and accidentals, and its implied “residual authority” of copy-text on those occasions where no critical discrimination among variants seems possible, allow both fidelity (to copy-text accidentals) and conjecture (in selection of variant substantives) their proper roles. The notion of residual authority is also perhaps a form of compromise, for it retains the concept of best-text without withdrawing from active interpretation and criticism of this best-text and other variant states. The degree to which Greg’s rationale properly represents the actual history of compositorial and authorial practice in any period after the Renaissance is still being debated, and copy-text theory as a whole has yet to make much inroad into the editing of medieval texts. But Greg’s theory (especially through Bowers’s championing of it and Tanselle’s explication and defense of it) has at least provided a framework or a mechanism for the active discussion of intention and criticism (even though Greg’s essay did not really attend to the former of these two terms), and it is likely that the editing of English and American literature will be influenced (pro or con) by his essay for some time to come, despite the recent changes in philosophical emphasis described at the conclusion of the previous chapter. Indeed, there are even signs of its basic precepts being debated in other disciplines (for example, music, see Broude, Kallberg).

The critical edition will therefore contain emendations, and these emendations will involve one level or other of editorial conjecture. What these emendations will produce in an intentionalist edition is of necessity a degree of authorial intention unrepresented by any of the extant witnesses. But what if this intention, when discoverable, turns out to be manifold rather than single? What if it is dynamic rather than static? As observed in the previous chapter, the work of the many recent scholars (revisionists, textologists, New Scholars, revisionists, social textual critics, geneticists, etc.) has focused upon those texts which either contradict themselves internally and so betray their original intentions in their subsequent revisions (e.g., Melville’s Pierre or Mailer’s American Dream) or are subject to external, non-authorial pressures which may be accepted by authors but which complicate or even vitiate the very concept of intentionality (e.g., Crane’s Red Badge of Courage). But several of these new revisionist schools (especially Parker’s New Scholarship and McGann’s social textual criticism) have been criticized by intentionalist, eclectic critics for their
failure to address in practical terms the very problems they posit: while perhaps effectively describing the textual phenomena, the revisionists have not yet produced a critical vehicle for representing them in a scholarly edition. Given the conditions of revised and contradicted and socialized and multiplied intention, should one simply not read Melville, Mailer, and Crane at all, or read them in two or three discrete versions, or read only the remnants, or what?

One type of answer has been produced by the genetic editors (more common in the scholarly editing of French and German authors than anglophone, see Chapter 8), and the best-known genetic edition of late has been Hans Walter Gabler's *Ulysses*, which provides a "synoptic apparatus" of the text(s) on the verso pages, balanced—or contradicted by—a clear-text reading version on the recto pages. The synoptic version includes all variants within the critical text-page, rather than critically editing a copy-text, producing a clear text, and relegating rejected readings to the apparatus. In a synoptic apparatus, there are no rejected readings (or at least, no authorial ones). The conflict between synpticism and intentionality in part explains the contention which this edition has generated (see Bates, Kidd, Rossman), for Gabler's attempted marriage of a Continental, non-authorial method and an Anglo-American, author-centered, presentation has not been fully successful, or at least not fully understood, and has exacerbated the other issues raised about the edition (for example, its failure to consult originals of primary documents, its ambivalent emendations policy, and the problematic status of some of the readings recorded only in historical collation.)

Another development of the principle of versioning and geneticism can be seen in the work of John Miles Foley, the editor of Yugoslav oral literature who, confronted by an enormous range of variants and having, for obvious reasons, no clearly defined concept of a documentary copy-text, has produced a computer-generated series of texts, each one obeying different critical requirements with regard to particular versions of particular oral formulae. In this case (as in the manipulation of the evidence documented in a synoptic apparatus), textual critics or critical readers create their own texts from the raw materials presented by the editor, in a technically more advanced but conceptually similar manner to that traditionally employed by the editor of a conventional critical edition with full historical collation. The difference between such a traditional edition and the experiments with Joyce and oral literature is largely in format, not theory. By placing the accepted reading on the textual page and relegating other readings to the apparatus or the historical collation (usually printed in smaller type, and sometimes placed in the back of the book, or even in a different volume), the editor of a traditional critical text is, in the very layout of the edition, enshrining a hierarchy of variants: those which make it onto the textual page are somehow in a different class from those which are printed in apparatus and collation. And this is rightly so, for the editor presumably believes that the text-page readings are better than those recorded elsewhere. The Foley computer selection and the Joyce synoptic apparatus may therefore be looked upon either as technical attempts to make all the information available simultaneously, or (as a result of their conscious sacrifice of the hierarchy of variants) as yet another version of Donaldson's "editorial death-wish" already encountered in Chapter 8—the futile pretense that no critical decisions are necessary in editing critical texts and that Lachmannian stemmatics, or new bibliography, or distributional analysis, or computer programs can protect the editor from having to think.

But there are some works which do not respond to the conventional interpretation of the editorial mandate to produce a single critical edition. For example, is it really possible for us to read the 1799, 1805, and 1850 versions of Wordsworth's *The Prelude* as if they were all simply "variants" of the same work? What about the F and G versions of the Prologue to Chaucer's *Legend of Good Women*, in which the bestowing of textual priority on one or the other would involve the sacrifice of much fine "Chaucerian" verse? Do we suppose that when Dickens changed the "unhappy" ending of *Great Expectations* to a "happy" one at the instigation of Bulwer Lytton he was being subjected to the same sort of literary censorship as that which caused Crane's *Red Badge of Courage* to lose its original intentions because of his editor Ripley Hitchcock's textual interference? And is it therefore possible for sensitive readers to hold both endings of the Dickens novel in their minds as parts of the same work? What of the constant revisions and additions in such works as Sidney's *Arcadia* or Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*, or the two versions of *King Lear* and the three versions of *Hamlet*? Is Pope's original, satiric version of *The Rape of the Lock* compatible (textually? esthetically?) with the expanded mock-epic version? Is Fowles's mature revision of his juvenile *The Magus* destructive of the original intentions of that work? And, in reference to two works already cited in a different context: does the final version of *The Waste Land* display more of Eliot or of Pound as they are represented in the manuscript? And why did it take five centuries for anybody to notice that *Piers Plowman* was not really
one poem but three poems, and how has it now apparently become possible for some textual critics to regard it as one again, (when Kane and Donaldson rationalize their emendations policy for the B version by an appeal to the readings of Kane’s earlier edition of the A version)?

These questions, it should be emphasized, are not peculiar to the editing and/or textual criticism of literature, for in music the changing intentions and locales of Verdi’s Masked Ball, for example, or the protean changes—in length and content—of his Don Carlo(s), the two versions of the Sibelius Violin Concerto (the first of which was released by the Sibelius family only in 1991), and the post-Tristan stylistic revisions of the Dresden version of Wagner’s Tannhäuser betray a similar complexity, as does Chopin’s regularly having sent off—sometimes on the same day—three radically different versions of solo piano works to his three publishers in England, Germany, and France (Kallberg). How can the reader/editor deal with such discrepancies when the authors/composers cannot seem to make up their minds about what are the work’s intentions? In the case of Tannhäuser, the option of an embarrassment of riches seems almost always to be exercised, despite the resultant clash of two different chromatic systems—rather like printing both endings of Great Expectations in the same volume—but since this obeys authorial final rather than original intentions, it has a respectable rationale, since presumably Wagner was satisfied with the joining of a later style and an earlier work.

It is true that people do read Wordsworth and Dickens and they do listen to Verdi and Wagner, but it is perhaps equally true that the works they read and hear are sometimes best regarded not as single entities, with the possibility of the textual critic’s being able to arrive at a single, definitive text embodying all authorial intentions.

Even with the convenience of the hierarchy of variants presentable in apparatus (a convenience not possible, of course, in the actual performance of temporal media like music or spatial media like painting), some works may finally destroy their own integrity, achieving or displaying what the deconstructionists like to call their aporia, their “central knot of indeterminacy,” and may therefore have to be considered as related, but nonetheless separate works. The editorial solutions to this condition may range from a determined rejection of one or other alternative (apparently the norm with Great Expectations), to parallel-text editions (often used, for example, in the editing of the Chaucer Legend) to completely independent editions of the various versions (as in the usual modern editing of Piers Plowman). It is in works such as these that the discipline of textual criticism and its attendant practice of editing seem to reach their limits, as traditionally defined.

It is also true that, with changes in technology it is now possible for the recipient of the text to manipulate the textual evidence to produce variant states, not all of which may reflect authorial intention, or at least single or final intention. Thus, recent recordings of Don Carlos (i.e., in its original French text, not in the Italian translation, Don Carlo) and of Show Boat take advantage of CD technology and include variant versions of several arias which can then be programmed individually into the listener’s desired order for the work as a whole, displacing those in the main text with the push of a button. Taking advantage of this facility, the editors/producers of a recent CD recording of Handel’s Messiah actually provide the users with a key to recreate any of the nine distinct versions which Handel wrote: the 1741 autograph, the Dublin premiere of 1742, the Covent Garden performances of 1743, 1745, and 1750, the London Foundling Hospital performance of 1759, Handel’s conducting score, with changes made to his death in 1759, and a copy produced in Dublin in 1761. Even this largesse is insufficient to chart the actual performance variation, however; for while the orchestral forces on the recording remain constant, there was a larger body of strings in 1749 and possibly no oboes in Dublin (Kenyon). Thus, only textual variance is offered, not performance variance. Moreover, what the producers do not emphasize is that the CD player is not restricted to just these nine “authorized” versions, for the individual listener can obviously “mix and match” various arias from various states to construct virtually unlimited conflated editions. It will surely not be long before it is the norm for editors of literary editions to provide similar reader-manipulated facilities in electronic editions based on the so-called hypertext principle of variant electronic storage. Such editions might properly be called post-critical, in that the editor does not establish a text nor does he or she simply reproduce a previously existing text. Such editions provide the raw materials (through hypertext) for a series of possible conflated editions, in a manner very different from the fixing of text usually associated with critical editions. The future of scholarly editing is clearly a very exciting and provocative one, as these technological possibilities become reality.

Even now, the computer is an essential and inevitable part of scholarly editing. It is in the early stages of editing, especially colla-
tion and filiation, and in the very end, concordances and indexes, that computers have proved most useful so far, with comparatively limited electronic influence on the middle stages of textual criticism or emendation.

For example, it is safe to say that no complete record of the fundamental units of a verbal text—its words—will ever again be done without computer assistance. Such concordances, if they are to be of textual value, will not merely list the words in a work or œuvre but will show a selection from the text in which they appear. There are basically two ways of making such selections—with KWIC (key-word-in-context) and KWOC (key-word-out-of-context) concordances. In a KWIC concordance, the keyword (the main entry) will be recorded as it appears in a particular lexical position, say, in the middle of a word block with five or ten words on each side—with no reference to how the word appears on the textual page (at the beginning or end of a line, for example). A KWIC concordance can be instructed to sort the keyword to the left or right of such a block, but a central position is generally more useful for observing how the word is used in its context. The KWIC system is widely used in fluid texts like prose or verse with much enjambment. The KWOC concordance, on the other hand, will position the keyword not in a particular lexical context but rather as it appears in a specific textual unit (e.g., a metrical line); in such concordances, an editor will be more interested in seeing how the word is used by an author in the line rather than in the word-block. Thus, a KWIC concordance for the word “impediment” in Shakespeare’s sonnets (with the keyword in a central context of five words on either side) would yield an entry “marriage of true minds/Admit impediment. Love is not love/Which,” whereas a KWOC concordance using the metrical line as its unit would record “Admit impediment. Love is not love.” Despite the iambic pentameter of the sonnet structure, the KWIC system shows the enjambment better (although this is in part because the sample is larger). Each method has its advantages, and the concordance-maker will have to decide which better suits the textual conditions.

Other problems in computer concordances include homographs (e.g., how does the computer distinguish between “does” [third person singular of the verb “to do”] and “does” [plural of the female deer]?) and lemmatization (how does the computer recognize a word temporarily disguised by, e.g., prefixes or variant spelling: should the word “pressure” be regarded by the computer as having the prefix “pre-”?). Through morphological segmentation sub-programs, it may be possible to make these distinctions, especially in texts with typically small lexicons, like Old English, but often the entire text may need to be pre-sorted syntactically and morphemically. On a wider lexical scale—entire languages—a scholar may now do semantic, morphological, or syntactic searches (Stubbs and Tompa, Amos) through the parsing facilities of such dictionaries as the revised OED (Oxford English Dictionary), DARE (Dictionary of American Regional English), DOE (Dictionary of Old English), and TLF (Tresor de la langue française). An editor working on a Shakespeare text may determine not only whether a particularly word is ever used by Shakespeare—from the Spevack concordance to the Riverside edition—but also whether this word occurs in any other headnote citations collected in OED. An editor may also discover, say, all words entering the English language from Italian in the sixteenth century or all quotations from Shakespeare, or Milton, or Keats, or Melville, cited in the NOED. Another related form of computer assistance is in vocabulary or stylistic studies, usually concerned with forming a view of the author’s idiolect, the personal imprint upon the language choices available. However, one must be very careful here to construct this imprint from neutral terms and must be very wary of context. For example, a recent stylistic study of the Pearl poet (quoted in Pearsall and Cooper, “Statistical Approach” 371–72) came up with the surprising results that the author had a high incidence of “I,” “me,” “she,” and “her,” but a very low incidence of “he,” “him,” “they,” and “them,” where a quick look at the context of Pearl—a dialogue between a narrator-dreamer and a vision of a young maiden—would immediately determine why this was so. Similarly, “p” is obviously a very common alliterative initial in Pearl, “c” a very common alliterative initial in Cleanliness, etc. Thus, the context may pre-determine the results of stylistic studies, which ought therefore to concentrate as far as possible on unconscious selections within the idiolect, not substantive ones.

In collation of witnesses, computers can remove much of the drudgery formally associated with textual scholarship, especially when used with optical scanners such as the Kurzweil machine. However, most editorial experience suggests that scanners can be used with confidence only on printed texts of the machine-print, post 1800, era, in which there is a chartable degree of uniformity and variance in the physical appearance of type-forms, although some recent experiments on manuscripts offer the possibility of direct electronic entry of handwritten text with an accuracy rate as high as 99% (Giunta and
Hacker).

Once the various witnesses have been scanned or otherwise entered into the collation program, then the charting of variants and the mapping of filiation can proceed electronically. The current range of collation and filiation programs is very wide and will no doubt be wider in the years ahead. Some work line by line, some with blocks of a specific number of words; some can compare only two texts at a time, others up to fifty. The best known at present (Hockey, Guide; Oakman) include Widmann’s program for A Midsummer Night’s Dream, project OCCULT (Ordered Computer Collation of Unprepared Literary Text), the Cabaniss program, and COLLATE. Ted-Larry Pebbworth and Gary Stringer’s collation program, based on the Donne Variorum, is available for personal computers, as is Peter Shillingsburg’s CASE (Computer Assisted Scholarly Editing) system, based on the Thackeray edition. CASE is particularly useful, since it combines nine interrelated programs which do much more than merely collate. For example, CASE can produce fair copy from a diplomatic transcription, merge variant files into a single comprehensive historical collation, sort lists of selected variants, and turn working lists of variants into files appropriate for producing textual apparatus. For filiation, Vinton Dearing has written several useful programs, including PRELIMDI, ARCHETYP, and MSFAMTRE, the latter using the data collected in PRELIMDI, and then arranging the variants according to theory of probability (Hockey, Guide: 158-59).

While computers have been used to research, edit, produce, and typeset printed critical editions, fully electronic texts, marketed in computer-readable form and even manipulated by the reader and used to create reader-designed critical editions, are still in the planning stage—although there is little doubt that they will come soon. The cumulative electronic storage in hypertext of all forms and states of text forming that text’s history will assuredly provide the raw and combinatorial materials for the production of reader- (or more correctly, viewer-) created editions in the near future, as suggested by Shillingsburg (Scholarly Editing, “Polymorphic”) and others. (See McGann on D. G. Rossetti, Duggan on Piers Plowman, and Mosser, Robinson on The Canterbury Tales; Chernik, Landow, Lanham, McGillivray, and Sanders for general discussions; and the Cti Center Resources Guide for practical information.) Foley’s HEURO I (“Editing” 85-89) has already shown the way, with its ability to allow the operator at a computer terminal to experiment among the motifs arranged in the “object text”—a hypertextual transmission of the text to and by the receiver. Electronic versions of print editions, such as the Oxford Shakespeare and the Riverside Chaucer, while not fully reader- or user-manipulable like HEURO I, allow the reader to search the text for lexical and morphological features in a manner not possible in their print counterparts.

These are some of the technological and theoretical alternatives presented to the would-be editor. But what of the practicalities, the actual production of scholarly editions? What guidelines can be offered for the editor in preparing the materials for the reader-user? There are several useful manuals for would-be editors, either for entire disciplines (e.g., Mary-Jo Kline’s Guide to Documentary Editing, promoted by the historians of the Association for Documentary Editing) or for particular periods (e.g., the Foulet-Speer On Editing Old French Texts), and several longstanding editions have manuals developed for the editing of the works of particular authors. The best general practical guide for scholarly editing can be found in the Guidelines published by the Committee on Scholarly Editions of the Modern Language Association, and the final part of this chapter reflects the general order and content of this brochure. For details of any of the stages briefly covered in the next few pages, I would strongly suggest that the editor obtain the CSE Guidelines and confer with the Committee, and to consult the historical surveys and research guides in my forthcoming Scholarly Editing.

Before any genuine editorial work begins, the textual scholar must have decided exactly what is the work or works to be edited. This may not be as obvious as it seems, for the very definition of work and author can be highly problematical. The issue has been stated in its widest terms by Foucault (“What Is an Author?”):

Even when an individual has been accepted as an author, we must still ask whether everything that he wrote, said, or left behind is part of his work. The problem is both theoretical and technical. When undertaking the publication of Nietzsche’s works, for example, where should one stop? Surely everything must be published, but what is “everything”? Everything that Nietzsche himself published, certainly. And what about rough drafts of his works? Obviously. The plans for his aphorisms? Yes. The deleted passages and the notes at the bottom of the page? Yes. What if, within a workbook filled with aphorisms, one finds a reference, the notation of a meeting or of an address, or a laundry list: Is it a work, or not? Why not? And so on, ad infinitum. How can one define a work
amid the millions of traces left by someone after his death? A theory of the work does not exist, and the empirical task of those who naively undertake the editing of works often suffers in the absence of such a theory. (103–104).

At the time Foucault wrote this (1969), editorial theory on the “work” was indeed much less sophisticated than it is now, but it is still true that there is a good deal of unresolved argument about what ought properly to be within the documentary canon of a given author (e.g., how many variant versions of the “same” work?), and the editor must at least have confronted the general questions posed by Foucault before beginning the selection of materials. The CSE guidelines go even further than Foucault, for they raise the question of “second-party” textual materials (e.g., letters to as well as from the author, or changes introduced by persons other than the author: copy-editors, proof-readers and so on).

Once the basic logic of selection has been determined, the ontology of the work or works, the editor must then make sure that every potentially useful primary document has been located, adequately described, and that arrangements have been made to gain access to this material. Obviously, any clearly authoritative documents must be included in a bibliography of primary materials (e.g., holograph manuscripts, manuscripts or printed editions personally overseen by the author, copies made from lost holographs, etc.), but so must all other witnesses to the text that could have potential authority. For example, until a complete genealogy of textual transmission has been determined, any manuscript which carries the text and cannot be easily demonstrated to be a copy of an extant exemplar (and only of that exemplar) must appear as a primary document: In practice, this means that in the editing of classical, biblical, and medieval texts, the great majority (perhaps all) of the primary witnesses will be posthumous copies, and even in the printed age posthumous editions may need to be considered as potentially authoritative witnesses, for they may very well depend upon lost authorities not otherwise accessible.

As noted several times in this book, many of Shakespeare’s plays appeared for the first time in the posthumous First Folio, and others, while having been published earlier, had their texts significantly changed in the Folio, possibly representing an authorial revision since the earlier publication. The date of the document is not, therefore, automatically an assurance of its authority or otherwise.

For editing with a non-intentionalist purpose, and especially for social textual criticism, the traditional procedures associated with the attempted recovery of intention and therefore for evaluating the potential significance of a witness will not always be relevant. It may be that a demonstrably non-authorial state (e.g., one produced through corrupt transmission or through the constraints of censorship) may have greater social prominence and have contributed more to the social “meaning” of the work than a witness with clearly more substantial claims to represent authorial intention (see the arguments of Pizer and McGann in the previous chapter). In such cases, documents will not be adjudicated according to their relative closeness to a putative authorial original but according to their status in the subsequent reception of the work. In a sense, all documents are therefore potentially primary in social textual criticism, and perhaps especially posthumous ones.

Another type of material which also ought to be included in either intentionalist or historical initial bibliography is any source or analogous text which might be able to offer useful information on dubious readings in the first-level authoritative documents. For example, if the work being edited is a translation or compendium, the editor should have the primary sources of the work at hand. This is not to suggest that these sources should automatically be used to offer emendations to the edition as a matter of principle, but rather that patterns of translation or quotation might be established from which choices among a series of non-authoritative witnesses could, with editorial care and discrimination, be determined. In some cases, it is possible to decide exactly which manuscript or edition of a source work was used by the author, but in the editing of older material such fine determinations might not be possible (indeed, as has been mentioned before, the printing of a work in the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries typically entailed the loss of exemplars and other sources upon which the printing depended). The presence of such analogous or collateral texts does not mean that their readings can be accepted as significant for the text being edited, even when the analogue or source is manifestly correct and the derivative text incorrect, for, as Tanselle ("External Fact") and Greetham ("Models") have shown, the relationship between source and derived text is often a highly problematical one, requiring not only that the editor establish the specific route whereby the former might have influenced the latter, but also that the editor critically evaluate each possible link between the two with the same sensitivity brought to the elucidation of any other type of variance. In
other words, authority can never be assumed; it must always be tested and explained.

Finally, in the initial bibliography, the editor should make sure that all possibly relevant personal material (letters, memoranda, diaries, etc.) are available for consultation, especially where they might bear upon the publication history of the work. Again, certain qualifications must be raised here, for it would be a mistake to allow intentions expressed in a personal document to modify or even determine the intentions demonstrable in the text of the work itself. An author may claim to have undertaken one sort of work but in fact have produced another, and an author's critical evaluation of that work is not prima facie any more reliable or authoritative than any other commentator's. Some authors (like Beckett) are perversely unhelpful about their works, and even some intentionalistic textual critics may question and ultimately reject the announced intentions of an author, as in the example cited in the previous chapter (p. 336) of Tanselle's rejection of Melville's expressed views on the text of the second edition of Typee.

I have introduced a number of complications into this very early stage—the compilation of the initial bibliography—simply to demonstrate that even the most apparently mechanical of editorial procedures require critical judicature. Many of these complications (intentionality, influence, social status) are typically not addressed directly until later stages of scholarly editing, but it is my belief that the well-informed editor must be aware of the ramifications of bibliographical decisions from the very beginning, while trying to keep the theoretical and methodological options open.

Thus, throughout the preparation of an initial bibliography, the editor should also attempt wherever possible to establish the provenance of the documents (date, place, history), for while it is the content of the documents which is of prime importance at this early stage, it might be that provenance could be of significant value later (e.g., in determining the relationship of the texts). But, as already suggested, provenance should not necessarily drive the methods and values of the edition, for it can be both helpful or misleading, even in the matter of establishing textual relationships.

This is in fact the next logical stage of editing, and whether it is called filiation, genealogy, recension, stemmatics or textual analysis, it must precede the choice of copy-text (where copy-text theory is used at all) and must depend upon preparation of an adequate bibliography. Obviously, the fixing of these textual relationships will depend upon an appropriate system for charting their similarities and differences, and this will involve a careful collation of the primary documents. Some theorists would claim that a complete collation of all documents must be achieved before filiation can be established, but others would require only trial collations at several places in each document, so that a base-text can be selected against which all others can then be collated in full. This two-stage collation is perhaps more common in the editing of ancient texts, where a developed "copy-text" theory has not been thought necessary or even possible, and where the "base-text" established after the trial collations will almost certainly be used as the de facto copy-text in the edition itself. Since the choice of a base-text in the editing of early texts typically involves only a consideration of substantive variants, this practice may be quite defensible in this field, although it does leave open the possibility that the base-text selected after the first stage of collation might have to yield to another after the collation of all documents. It is unlikely, however, that most editors of two-stage collation would accept Charles Moorman's whimsical suggestion that initial copy-text is selected "by guess or God" (45).

For printed texts, the collation of representative copies of each edition is no longer felt by most bibliographers or editors to be sufficient to establish filiation, for it has been demonstrated that—perhaps especially in the editing of vernacular texts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—there are often significant variants within editions. In some cases, no two copies of the same edition may be identical. The editors of non-vernacular texts of this period (and some editors of Continental texts in this and other periods) have, however, resisted this new stringency, and for them an "edition" is still an integral, undeviating authority. In these circumstances of editorial disagreement, a reasonable compromise might be to suggest the procedures of the editors of the earlier materials—to collate at sample locations in the text of possibly variant copies of each edition, thereby to establish the likelihood of wider variance, and therefore the degree of complete collation required. At least the editors of printed texts can overcome some of the former drudgery of collation by using a mechanical optical collator, such as the Hinman or McLeod, for copies of the same edition.

As has already been shown in Chapter 8, the charting of relationships (after or during collation) has engendered some very complex technical systems of analysis—Greg's calculus of variants, Quentin's positive critical apparatus, Dearing's rings and principle of parsimo-
ny — and the complexity of the systems in part reflects the obvious complexity of the possible relationships, where contamination (the remembered influence of another, more familiar, text in the scribe’s copying) and conflation (the actual combining of readings from two or more exemplars into the new copy) may often be the norm in certain textual transmissions. In general, it can be observed that the editors of printed texts have been much more likely to find a monogogeneous transmission than a heterogeneous (i.e., a straight line of direct descent from one edition to another, rather than a stage of the transmission generating several different descendants and/or itself depending upon different exemplars). For this reason, it is the editors of manuscript works who have tended to formulate the complex systems for describing such heterogeneous traditions, whereas the editors of printed texts have tended to develop the science of the technical analysis and description of books (analytical and descriptive bibliography) to a greater extent than their colleagues working on manuscripts.

Ideally an editor should be competent in both fields, for while the physical and textual nature of a work might not always coincide, and while some theorists (Dearing “Textual Analysis”) have declared that the two characteristics must be considered separately, the editor must have the expertise to interpret the evidence of both sub-disciplines at some point during the establishment of filiation. As noted in the previous chapter, however, editing from the evidence of recension or filiation has often been rejected by recent editors, who may deny either that filiation is particularly valuable in what it can tell us about the social history of the text’s reception or that filiation can even be established. As mentioned earlier, “deep editing” of the type most famously practised by Kane and Donaldson in their edition of Piers Plowman falls into this latter persuasion, when they argue that recension cannot be consistently demonstrated in the highly conflated and contaminated manuscripts of Langland. The practical editorial results of such a rejection of filiation theory are that, without the “residual authority” of a copy-text derived from filiation, the editor must treat each variation independently, and thus analyze and edit each variant without recourse to documentary authority. The work must therefore be constructed piece by piece according to some other procedure, principle, or belief (the ontology of the text, the conception the editor might have of the author’s composition methods, the editorial characterization of typical scribal idiosyncrasies and their putative relationship to authorial originals). The weight placed upon editorial decisions is thus particularly onerous in deep editing carried out rigorous-

ly and comprehensively.

The next stage (if not already completed during the collation itself) is the selection of copy-text, given that a copy-text method is being employed. Enough has been said on this matter in the chapter on textual criticism to give the usual alternatives possible (e.g., whether an authorial manuscript, a first or later edition is considered to bear the greatest authority), and here it should suffice to emphasize that the choice of copy-text will be perhaps the most significant stage of the editorial process and will have a wide-ranging effect on the accidental features of the edited text. While copy-text ideology has dominated Anglo-American scholarly editing for most of the twentieth century, there are signs that, under the influence of structuralism, post-structuralism, and other non-intentionalist, versionist dispensations, it may gradually be ceding to one or other of the various fragmentalist, revisionist methods already discussed in the previous chapter. Thus, the text of the Gabler edition of Joyce’s Ulysses does not follow copy-text principles, but instead weaves together a seamless series of lections from various witnesses, without recourse to the “residual authority” that a fixed copy-text would provide—the reliance on copy-text readings where there is “indifferent variation” among the witnesses, and thus no critical means of making an authoritative distinction. Moreover, the “divided authority” of accidentals and substantives, on which classic Greg-Bowers copy-text theory was dependent, has similarly been the subject of much interrogation in recent years, as both the logic and the historical validity of Greg’s distinction have been challenged.

However, given that a copy-text theory is being used, and that a single copy-text has been selected according to one or other of the principles discussed earlier in this book, this copy-text will have to be transcribed according to clear and consistent principles, which should be presented in the textual introduction and made manifest on the textual page. Is the edition to attempt any degree of normalization (e.g., according to apparent authorial preferences) or modernization and if so, how is the normalization rationalized and practiced? Furthermore, the editor must decide how any transcriptional changes (even if they are only such conventions as the regularizing of “u”/“v” and “i”/“j” practice) are to be recorded (i.e., only as a general principle in the introduction, or for each change in the apparatus?). How are such features as word-division, abbreviations, and speech-heads to be handled (for example, are abbreviations to be silently expanded, or expanded with italics, or with a note in the apparatus)? Furthermore, on
what principles are emendations to be introduced into the text, by
what authority, and how recorded? Is it the intention of the editor
that all features of the copy-text should be recoverable from the read-
ings in the apparatus? What about variant readings in other witness-
es? Are they also to be included in the apparatus, or are they to be
relegated to a separate historical collation, leaving the apparatus re-
served for rejected readings from the copy-text?

The answers to many of these questions will obviously affect the
actual appearance of the textual page, and in particular the degree to
which apparatus is to be incorporated into the text itself, rather than
listed elsewhere. The choices here are between a “clear-text” reading
version (which in its purest state, would contain no editorial “flags”
to the reader that something has been introduced into the text) and an
“inclusive” text (where, by means of brackets, italics, diacritics or
other devices, the editor symbolically demonstrates to the reader ex-
actly what changes occurred between copy-text and edited text). A
“genetic text” might go even further, attempting to insert on the tex-
tual page all features of every stage of the text’s transmission, either
in the constitution of a specific document or for the total history of
the text. As has been shown already, a genetic text might be particu-
larly useful where there are several different authorial versions or
stages of composition in the work and the editor wishes the reader to
have access to all these versions or stages without editorial prejudice.
But if there is a demonstrable final intention to the work, and if criti-
cal judgments can or have been made between variants, then a clear-
text edition is probably best suited to the requirements of a critical
edition that it display the editor’s decisions on the author’s intentions
regarding the “perfected” state of the text. Such clear-text representa-
tions of final intentions have most usually been associated with liter-
ary works intended for publication (novels, poems, published versions
of plays), whereas inclusive-text display is often connected with doc-
uments under continual revision and not necessarily intended for pub-
lication (diaries, journals, letters).

Once the text itself has been edited, the textual scholar may turn to
the annotations (textual and otherwise) and the introduction, glossary,
index, and other ancillary materials. Some editors (indeed some dis-
ciplines) seem to regard the establishment of the text as a comparative-
ly trivial matter preceding the real purpose of the edition—the writing
of annotations. But a genuine critical edition will obviously have its
focus on the text: in fact, some critical editions may place the annota-
tions in a separate volume, or may not even include them at all.

However, for textual purposes, it is usually thought necessary that the
reader of a textual edition must have at the very least some account of
the publication history of the work, of the copies consulted for the
edition, of the relative authority of these copies, of the principles of
transcription and emendation (usually augmented by textual notes on
specifically troublesome “crucces” in the text), and of all deviations
from copy-text. In editions of prose printed texts, it has also become
common practice to include in scholarly editions a hyphenation list
(showing the reader how to quote from the text where hyphens occur
at the end of a line), but since hyphens are virtually unknown (in their
modern usage, anyway) in manuscripts of the medieval and Renais-
sance periods, it can normally be assumed that any hyphens are editor-
ial not authorial or scribal in editions of works from these periods.

Beyond these basic requirements, the scholarly edition may in-
clude explanatory or historical notes, often written by a scholar other
than the textual editor. Until recently, the nature and methods of
annotation had not been subjected to the sort of rigorous theoretical
interrogation accorded copy-text or emendation in Anglo-American
editing, but recent work by, for example, Spevack (“Editor as Philol-
ogist”), Hanna, and Middleton, has made clear that annotation is as
conceptually problematical as any other branch of editing, and is not
merely a mechanical provision of historical, cultural, linguistic, or
critical “facts” to fill out the bare text. Thus, an annotator now has to
consider whether annotation is perhaps a series of “guerrilla raids”
upon the text, whether it does not substitute a “vertical” alignment of
reference for the “horizontal” alignment (the momentum of narrative)
of the text, and what are the political connotations of living in anoth-
er’s “space” and acknowledging the text’s alterity (Middleton). On a
more practical level, the annotator must steer a very careful course
between, on the one hand, confusing the reader by giving too little
information, and, on the other, patronizing the reader by giving too
much. It is possible to argue (though more difficult now than it was
ten or twenty years ago) that a text can be definitive, fixed for all
time; but annotation is always contingent and local, for the relation-
ship between text and audience is always changing.

Beyond formal elucidatory annotation—bridging the cultural and
temporal gap between author and reader—there are other means of
editorial intervention. For example, if presenting a work in a particu-
larly difficult or historically removed dialect or stage in the lan-
guage’s development, a glossary or even a complete lexicon might be
necessary. The complete lexicon or concordance may often be pub-
lished separately, of course, and has obvious critical value for the charting of authorial preferences even where the language of the work is not particularly inaccessible. Concordances must be used with some care, however, for they can be as accurate as the text on which they are based and they can only provide linguistic or stylistic information within the context of the subject of the work, as already shown in the example of *Pearl* and *Cleanesse*. Thus, the Spevack Shakespeare concordance can give no information on contemporary accidentals usage, for it is based on a modern-spelling edition.

Finally, the edition may include an index (usually of proper nouns—persons, places, etc.—but sometimes of topics too), but this latter type is more likely to be a *desideratum* in historical works than in literary. Just as in all other stages of scholarly editing, the computer has changed both the methods and results of indexing, and while there are still some authors and editors who fervently cling to their 3" x 5" cards, the utility of such programs as CINDEX has removed much of the drudgery formerly associated with preparing an index. The same caveats as expressed elsewhere (e.g., about concordances and collation programs) still apply, however. While entering indexing commands as the text is established will ensure that a complete electronic record is available (and, especially in camera-ready editions, will allow continual revision of pagination reference as the edition progresses), it will still be necessary for the indexer to be aware of related but differently alphabetized forms of the same word, particularly in editions of texts in periods before spelling became standardized, and to be alert to suffix and prefix removal procedures and lemmatization, as discussed in the section on computer collation. And for the topical index there is finally no substitute for the judgment of the individual editor.

The frequent mention of computers in this chapter emphasizes that, perhaps more than any other activity in the humanities, scholarly editing has changed most and benefited most from the use of electronic storage and retrieval. But while this reliance on technology might appear to reinforce the argument of those who have always thought editing to be merely a mechanical procedure, ironically it might have the opposite implications. Removing a large part of the drudgery from traditional textual scholarship has served to highlight the special role of critical intervention in the most significant moments in the production of edited texts. The machines can provide the data, and can even present us with the options possible, but editing is ultimately, like every other aspect of textual scholarship covered in this book, finally a critical activity, and this is as true in collation as it is in selecting variants, as true in bibliographical description as it is in filiation. It is also true in the very last stage of scholarly editing—the publication of the edition. For with increasingly sophisticated desktop typesetting equipment and with the replacement of movable type by photoreproduction, the editor is now in a position to exert much greater personal control over the actual form of the scholarly edition than was possible in the days when a ragged typescript was gingerly handed over to the mercies of an often unlearned and unsympathetic compositor and publisher. One of the suggestions in the CSE guidelines is that the editor should alert the publisher to the fact that a scholarly edition may very well contain what look like misprints, and that these should not be "corrected." While it is impossible to predict exactly what form scholarly editions will take in the next few decades, one thing seems certain: that individual editors will come to have a greater involvement in all stages of technical production, and that the old, basically antagonistic relationship between scholar and publisher will be replaced by one in which the editor takes over more and more of the functions formerly assigned to the publisher (only the reader or user is likely to have an even greater role). With this power, however, comes ever more responsibility and ever more opportunity for the exercise of critical judgment.

This brief narrative of the stages in putting together a scholarly edition cannot cover each of the procedures in the sort of detail that an editor should consider them. Fuller aids to the planning of editions can be found not only in the textual introductions to major editions themselves (many of which have been cited in this book), but also in the guides and manuals mentioned in the text or listed in the bibliography. In addition to the consultation services offered by the CSE, a beginning editor can also make use of the professional groups mentioned earlier, especially the Toronto conferences on editorial methods, the Association for Documentary Editing, and the Society for Textual Scholarship, all of which hold meetings on matters of interest to textual scholars and at which editors in the planning stage of an edition may be able to meet formally or informally to discuss procedures.

The account of editorial procedures is necessarily simplified. For example, in the discussion of the glossary, there was no discussion of how each glossary entry should be related to the text or what form it should take (e.g., first occurrence only, normalized headword/keyword, recording of all variant spellings?). Nonetheless, this chapter does show how the procedures are related to each other, how one de-
Editing the Text

Pends upon another, and more important, how textual scholarship involves an enormously wide range of skills and critical decisions. This range has been demonstrated in part during the previous chapters of this book—from enumerative bibliography to analytical bibliography to textual bibliography—but it is in editing that the full scholarly dispensation comes into play. It is therefore natural that we should close with editing, for it is this activity of textual scholars which, despite the demurrals of the “anti-editing” school of McLeod, Warren, et al., will put them most on their mettle and which will have the greatest effect on their surrounding (and following) culture. Editions are extremely powerful vehicles of thought and expression: they determine how an author will be approached, and often how valued. It is a major responsibility when textual scholars become editors, and one which will give the widest currency to their theories and practices.

Appendix I
Pages from the Shakespeare First Folio

The following pages illustrate the problems of casting off copy discussed in Chapter 7 on textual bibliography. Refer to pages 285–88 above.
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Printed on acid-free, 250-year-life paper
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In Memory

of

My Mother